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LEVERAGE IN THE BOARD ROOM:
THE UNSUNG INFLUENCE OF PRIVATE LENDERS
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Frederick Tung
The influence of banks and other private lenders pervades public companies.
From the first day of a lendingarrangement, loan covenants and built-in contingency
provisions affect managerialdecisionmaking. Conventional corporategovernance
analysis has been slow to notice or account for this lender influence. Traditionally,
corporate governance discourse has focused only on corporate law arrangements.
The few existing accounts of creditors' influence over firm managersemphasize the
drasticactions creditors take in extreme cases--when a firm isin serious trouble-but
in fact, private lender influence is a routine feature of corporate governance even
absent financial distress.
While lenders of course intervene when their borrowers encounter distress,
recent empirical work demonstrates private lender influence at much earlierpoints
in the debtor-creditorrelationship. In addition to the effects of covenant constraints
and other initial loan terms, a subsequent covenant violation may trigger active
lender intervention, including imposition of additionallimits on managerialdiscretion.
Covenant violations and lender intervention, however, do not typically signal the
borrower'sfinancialdistress. Instead, this interactive response to ex post contingency is
routine. Both borrower and lender expect future modification of their deal terms,
and they contract in anticipationof it. Initial covenants and subsequent violations
effectively reallocate degrees of control from managers to lenders, in a fluid process
that commences with the inception of the lending arrangement.
In this Article, I explain the regularity of lender influence on managerial
decisionmaking-"lender governance"-comparing this routine influence to
conventional governance arrangementsand boards of directors in particular. I show
that the extent of private lender influence rivals that of conventional governance
mechanisms, and I discuss the doctrinal and policy implications of this unsung
influence. Accounting for lender governance requires a new examinationof corporate
fiduciary duties, debtor-creditor laws, and the regulatoryreform proposals that have
*
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emerged to address the current financial crisis. I also discuss the implications of
private lender influence for future corporategovernance research.
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Private Lenders and Corporate Governance

INTRODUCTION
In conventional accounts of corporate governance, corporate law occupies center stage as the exclusive mechanism for constraining managerial
discretion. Creditor influence is generally ignored. If discussed at all, creditor
influence is viewed as episodic and exceptional-arising dramatically and
only in the extreme case where a firm is in distress. In fact, banks and other
private lenders exercise influence over firm management that is both routine
and significant. Private lender influence often exceeds that of shareholdersincluding major shareholders-and the board of directors, and may even
dictate fundamental business decisions traditionally left to the board or
officers, even outside of the distress context. The dearth of attention to
lender governance is ironic given the dominance of the contractualist view of
the corporation within the legal academy and the thick web of contractual
commitments that bind the public company. This Article highlights private
lenders' important governance role, relying on recent empirical studies
showing private lenders' influence on corporations' financing and investment
decisions and operational matters. This Article's major contributions are
threefold. First, it explains the pervasiveness of private lender influence on
corporate decisionmaking, which is based on a durable and adaptable banking
relationship built on significant relationship-specific investment. Second, it
details the institutional and contractual features of private lending that constrain managerial discretion, as well as the limits of lender governance. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, it explores the implications of private lender
influence for corporate governance. Among other things, it analyzes the
important yet underappreciated link between financial regulation and corporate governance. Financial regulation affects lenders' incentives to monitor
and influence their borrower firms, which in turn affects lender governance
and the way nonfinancial firms are run. As regulators in the United States and
around the world remake their financial regulatory systems in response to the
recent financial crisis, they also generate important governance spillovers for
nonfinancial firms. Therefore, understanding the governance implications of
financial regulation has special urgency.
Ever since Berle and Means named the essential feature of the modem American public corporation'-the separation of ownership from
control-corporate scholars and policymakers have wrestled with the fundamental problem of aligning managerial incentives with investor interests.
1.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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Traditionally, the central challenge has been to design governance arrangements optimally to close the gap between ownership and control: to channel
managers' discretion to benefit one specific class of investor-common shareholders. Corporate law has been the preferred vehicle for effecting this
alignment of interests. This shareholder-centered approach is understandable.
Shareholders, as the firm's residual claimants, feel most keenly the benefits
and burdens of the firm's successes and failures. So for efficiency's sake,
governance should rightly focus on shareholder interests.
In the standard rendering, shareholder-owners essentially "hire" managers
to run the firm on shareholders' behalf. They accomplish this through their
elected board of directors, to whom shareholders entrust the authority to
manage the firm. The board in turn appoints officers, who are charged with
managing the business on a day-to-day basis. Directors and officers,
however, may not always act with shareholders' best interests at heart.
They may shirk, or they may steal.' In innumerable ways, managers may favor
themselves at shareholders' expense-consuming perquisites and leisure,
insulating themselves from takeover risk with entrenching provisions, building
empires for their own benefit, stacking boards with friendly directors who will
defer to management, or giving sweetheart deals to friends and relatives.
For their part, shareholders enjoy avenues for disciplining management.
Besides annually electing the board of directors, shareholders are entitled to
vote on important corporate transactions; they may offer their own qualifying proposals for a shareholder vote through the firm's proxy process; they
are the beneficiaries of managerial fiduciary duties and may sue to enforce
these duties; they may propose amendments to the firm's bylaws. Moreover,
the market for corporate control-by which acquirers may seek to displace
existing management-may perform a disciplining role. The threat of ouster
by hostile acquisition may focus managerial efforts.
Creditors have little or no role in this standard account of corporate
governance.3 Unlike shareholders, creditors' rights are defined primarily by
2. This is not to say that all managers are knaves or thieves. Shareholders, however, are not
often well positioned to identify knaves and thieves or to detect their theft or knavery. Governance
mechanisms are therefore useful.
3.
"According to [the] conventional account, creditors receive no special rights against
the corporation. The creditors' power is limited to suing the debtors when they fail to pay as
promised. Creditors do not have their hands on the levers of power." Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Private Debt and the
Missing Lever of CorporateGovernance, 154 U. PA. L.REV. 1209, 1215
(2006). All acknowledge that the existence of debt in the capital structure plays some disciplining
role, insofar as payment obligations reduce the amount of free cash managers have on hand to
squander. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323,324 (1986).
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their credit contracts.4 Creditors enjoy no special status under corporate law.
They are outsiders to the firm and generally have no say in how the firm is
run. Creditors are presumed to passively observe corporate wealth creation
while they collect their interest payments, to be stirred from their torpor only
in extreme circumstances-to enforce their contract rights only if the firm
falters and repayment is imperiled. "Neither their credit provision function
nor their limited equity ownership provide banks with sufficient power and
incentive to monitor. As a result, the monitoring role in the American corporate governance system is relegated to those who provide only equity capital
to the corporation-the shareholders."' In the standard telling, creditors are
passive. They are simply not a part of the classic corporate governance story.6
It turns out, however, that bank creditors and other private lenders often
enjoy significant oversight and influence over managerial decisions Banks
monitor investment, financing, and operational decisions as a matter of course.
Banks not only constrain these managerial decisions but on occasion dictate
them. The case of Warnaco offers a telling example.' Wamaco's CEO was
firmly entrenched. She chaired the board of directors and packed the board with
4.
See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99
(Del. 2007); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 2004).
5. Ronald J.Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders:
The Place of MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985, 989-90 (1993)
(footnote omitted). Especially when the discussion turns to comparative assessment of U.S. corporate
governance with the bank-centered systems of Japan and Germany, scholars emphasize that in
market-oriented financial systems like the U.S., banks have only a limited role to play in corporate
governance. JONATHAN P. CHARKAM, KEEPING BETTER COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

TEN YEARS ON 255 (2005); see LUTGART VAN DEN BERGHE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALISING WORLD: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 43 (2002); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.FIN. 737, 753-58 (1997).
6.
"Corporate law has focused too long on shareholders as the sole investors in the corporation,
the sole recipients of director duties and energies, and the sole hope for constraining the managers
of other people's money." Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1309, 1343 (2008) (arguing that the complexity of modem capital structures has rendered
traditional corporate fiduciary duties unworkable, and that managers instead should hew to the terms
of the firm's investment contracts).
7. Throughout this Article, for ease of exposition, I use of the term "bank" to include nonbank
private lenders as well. The most common nonbank private lenders include finance companies,
insurance companies, investment banks, hedge funds, and mutual funds. Nonbank lenders typically
hold riskier debt than banks, Mark Carey, Mitch Post & Steven A. Sharpe, Does Corporate Lending
by Banks and Finance Companies Differ?: Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting, 53 J.
FIN. 845, 846 (1998); David J.Denis & Vassil T. Mihov, The Choice Among Bank Debt, Non-Bank
Private Debt, and Public Debt: Evidence From New Corporate Borrowings, 70 J.FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (2003);
Greg Nini, How Non-Banks Increased the Supply of Bank Loans: Evidence From Institutional Term
Loans 3-4 (Mar. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), availableat http://ssm.com/
abstract= 1108818, though they typically enjoy the same contractual features as other private
corporate loans. See Nini, supra, at 2.
8.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1226-27.
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her cronies. Yet when she faltered and the firm needed a significant infusion
of new credit to continue operating, the CEO-friendly board could not resist
lenders' call for new management.9 Though the hiring and firing of a firm's
chief executive is the most crucial of board decisions, Warnaco's lenders
effectively decided that question. Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have
accordingly dubbed private lender power the "missing lever" of corporate
10
governance.
Baird and Rasmussen are among a handful of legal scholars that have
ventured outside of corporate law to study corporate governance. Yet even
these scholars interested in creditor governance focus primarily on the distress
context. They observe creditor action only after a borrower firm has lapsed
into financial distress, effectively casting the influence of private debt as episodic,
exceptional, and dramatic. My claim is broader. I argue that lender governance
arises not only when a firm approaches distress. Lender influence is pervasive.
Empirical research documents the regularity with which banks constrain fundamental managerial decisions even in the ordinary course of business. Bank
influence often rivals that of conventional governance mechanisms.
Creditor and shareholder interests may not always coincide. The debtequity conflict is well understood," and creditor influence may not always
benefit shareholders, as conventional corporate governance efforts typically
intend. However, shareholder and creditor interests may in fact overlap in many
circumstances-toward reducing managerial slack, for example, or curbing
excessive risktaking by management-and empirical evidence suggests that
bank debt may generally benefit the firm's shareholders. 2 I raise this as only a
possibility and do not attempt to prove it here, although I do highlight evidence
suggesting the efficiency of lender governance. Instead, my primary purpose
is to cure a blind spot at the intersection of the corporate governance and
bankruptcy law discourses: to show that private lender influence significantly
constrains managerial discretion in the ordinary course and to discuss the

9.

See id. at 1226.

10.
Id. at 1211.
11.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.FIN. ECoN. 305 (1976) (discussing the agency costs of
debt versus equity).

12. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else Matters for
Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991 (2008) (demonstrating
empirically the value-enhancing effect of bank monitoring); infra notes 37-38 and accompanying
text (discussing event studies showing positive abnormal stock returns accompanying firms' public

announcements of bank loans); infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text (discussing potential
efficiency of capital expenditure covenants).
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important doctrinal and policy considerations of this unsung influence.13
Moreover, possible conflict with equity holders is not the only potential
drawback to lender governance. Even if lender governance is efficient, it is
susceptible to being frustrated or hijacked,'4 as are traditional governance
mechanisms. Regardless, appreciation for the role of private lenders in corporate governance is crucial for a complete understanding of the influence
that investors wield over firm management. Private lending is, after all, the
single largest source of external financing for public corporations, larger than
public debt and equity combined,'5 and eighty percent of public companies
maintain private credit agreements. 6
Understanding lender governance is especially important in the current
milieu, as the global financial crisis directly affects the nature of lender governance in two important respects. First, to state the obvious, borrowers may

be financially unstable, and banks are nervous. This mutual insecurity has
caused lenders to intensify their monitoring efforts, including tightening up
on covenants' 7-financial benchmarks that borrowers are required to meet
on a regular basis. Tighter covenants mean less slack for borrowers, which
means more regular lender intervention-that is, more active lender governance. Second, the coming transformation of U.S. financial regulation will
have important effects on lenders' incentives and behavior. Changes in the
regulatory regime will cause changes in lender governance. Tighter covenants and regulatory reform will each affect the way nonfinancial firms-the
13.
I focus on banks' influence as creditors. Banks have recently been shown to affect governance through other avenues as well. Banks may systematically affect the market for corporate
control, stimulating takeovers of their borrower firms by transmitting private information about their
borrowers to potential acquirers. Victoria Ivashina et al., Bank Debt and Corporate Governance, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 41 passim (2009). Banks may play this matchmaking role in order to cause more
creditworthy acquirers to acquire less creditworthy targets, thereby reducing credit risk and enhancing
the strength of banks' loan portfolios. Id. at 72. Banks may also affect corporate managers
through the voting rights they exercise as trustees for their banking clients' trust portfolios. Joao
A.C. Santos & Kristin E. Wilson, Does Banks' Corporate Control Benefit Firms?: Evidence From U.S.
Banks' Control Over Firms' Voting Rights (AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, EFA 2007 Ljubljana
Meetings Paper, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=891671.
14.
See infra Part IV.
15.
Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in HANDBOOK OF THE
EcONOMIcs OF FINANCE: VOLUME 1A CORPORATE FINANCE 433 (George M. Constantinides et al.
eds., Elsevier 2003); Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence
From Private Credit Agreements 1 (July 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1017629.
16.
Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment
Policy 1-2 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 928688.
17.
Anousha Sakoui, Covenants in Spotlight as Banks Reduce 'Headroom' on Company Debt,
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at 18, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47f39a76-6ecf-lldd-a8Oa
0000779fdl8c.html.
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borrowers-are run."8 This Article is the first to analyze the effects of impending
regulatory reform on the governance of nonfinancial firms. I focus on
proposals for regulation of credit default swaps-so central to the financial
crisis 1g-and their trading. Though firm predictions as to the ultimate contours
of the financial regulatory framework are elusive, it is useful nonetheless to
identify potential corporate governance spillovers from reforms that are
sure to affect private lenders' operations and monitoring incentives. More
generally, my discussion of lender governance offers one illustration of the
increasing complexity of corporate capital structures and the thorny governance
implications of this complexity. As financial innovation increasingly blurs
the traditional line between debt and equity, a singular focus on shareholdercentered governance may well be obsolete.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I offers background, reviewing
the financial and legal literature on banks' special monitoring abilities. It
also recounts the conventional corporate law framework for firm governance,
highlighting the director's role and proposing a framework for assessing the
degree of private lender influence by comparing directors' influence. Part II
outlines the contractual and institutional structure of lender governance,
describing important loan covenants and banks' institutional practices that
facilitate monitoring and governance. Part III explains the dynamics of private
lenders' leverage over firm management. It describes the durable nature of
the banking relationship, the incentive structure built into the initial lending
agreement, and the range of bank responses to covenant violations. It also
discusses the recent empirical learning in three important areas of private
lender influence: financial policy, investment policy, and CEO replacement.
Part IV discusses the limits of lender influence. Credit market effects-liquidity
and risk transfer opportunities-may dampen lenders' monitoring incentives and
their influence. Part V discusses the implications of lender governance for
corporate law, financial regulation, and governance research.

18.
To offer one concrete example, tighter covenants may reduce nonfinancial firms' levels of
capital investment. See infra Part III.C.2. At the same time, financial regulatory reform may
augment or diminish lenders' incentives to police capital investment restrictions diligently. See infra
Part V.C.
19.
"Any honest assessment [of the origins of the financial crisis] must include the role that
credit default swaps have played in this mess: it's the elephant in the room, the $30 trillion market
that people do not want to talk about." Gretchen Morgenson, Time to Unravel the Knot of CreditDefault Swaps, N.Y. TIMEs, January 24, 2009, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
01/25/business/25gret.html?_r= 1&scp=2&sq=morgenson&st=cse.
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BACKGROUND AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Traditionally, corporate governance scholarship and policymaking have
focused on protecting shareholder interests, with corporate law as the primary, if
not exclusive, institutional arrangement for allocating control rights and
constraining managerial discretion in public companies. 0 Explicit external
contractual governance mechanisms have largely been ignored." Despite the
ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation within the legal
academy," legal scholars have not generally noticed the extent of lender governance or discussed its contours or potential effects. 3 Corporate law casebooks
and treatises similarly ignore creditor influence on managerial decisionmaking.
The sparse legal literature that does exist on lender governance focuses primarily on distress-induced creditor intervention.
This Part first offers background and then a framework for assessing the
significance of lender governance. This framework previews later analysis in
the Article by comparing lender influence with that of corporate directors,
with special focus on independent directors, whose increased prominence and
power has been central to recent corporate governance reforms. Later
discussion will quantify lender influence in specific areas of corporate policy,
demonstrating its significance directly.

20.
"Corporate law and corporate governance are flip sides of the same coin." Roberta
Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277 (1996).
21.
A handful of exceptions exist. Scholars have identified bond indentures and directors'
and officers' (D&O) insurance policies as promising or potential sources of contract-based
governance. See Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance Structure
for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L.REV. 447 (1999) (proposing a new "supertrustee" to serve as a more
active bondholder representative than the current indenture trustee arrangement); Tom Baker &
Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From the Directors' & Officers' Liability
Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (surveying D&O insurance underwriters, who
overwhelmingly view corporate governance arrangements as important for assessing liability risk, and
hypothesizing that higher insurance premiums for higher risk firms may serve to deter managerial
misbehavior); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON.
117 (1979) (explaining the role of bond covenants in incentivizing shareholders to pursue a firmvalue-maximizing investment policy). But see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor
in Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer,95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007) (finding
that D&O insurers do not offer loss prevention services or otherwise monitor corporate governance).
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002);
22.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies From a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1273 (1999).
23.
The legal literature has extensively discussed bank influence in the context of small firms.
See, e.g., Robert E.Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986).
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Shareholder-Centered Corporate Law

Corporate governance scholars and policymakers focus primarily on
relations among firm managers and equity holders, relying on corporate law
arrangements to align managers' incentives with shareholder interests and to
mediate relations among small and large shareholders. The central project is
to calibrate the right amount of shareholder, director, and market oversight
for optimal governance. Important recent corporate governance debates
focus on shareholder concerns as expressed through traditional corporate
law mechanisms: shareholder influence in corporate elections,24 the role and
responsibilities of activist institutional shareholders,25 the scope and nature of
directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders,26 amounts and forms of executive
compensation, board composition, and the decoupling of voting rights
from economic rights.29 These debates illustrate the corporate-law-focused,
shareholder-centered nature of corporate governance discourse, an understandable focus given shareholders' traditional centrality in corporate law as
"tprincipals
"..
owners, and residual claimants.32

24.
Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for IncreasingShareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for reform of director election process to empower shareholders), and
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter
Bebchuk, Myth of the Shareholder Franchise] (same), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) (defending the existing limited role for
shareholders), and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (discussing the same).
25.
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255 (2008).
26.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008) (critiquing Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporationv.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (en banc), for its confusing analyses of good faith and the duty
of oversight); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J.
CORP. L. 833 (2007) (arguing that courts should be sensitive to structural bias on boards of directors
when analyzing good faith).
27.

See LUcIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED

PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 453 (2008).
28.
See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance,54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999); April Klein, Firm Performanceand Board Committee
Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998).
29.
See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
30.
E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, ManagerialPower and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 761 (referring to
shareholders as principals and corporate managers as their agents).
31.
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007)
(referring to shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation).
32.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 22, at 36, 91.
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B.

Creditor Governance: Banks Are Special

In contrast to corporate governance scholars and policymakers, finance
scholars have known for some time that banks are special. Banks enjoy institutional advantages over other investors that make them ideal monitors.
Their institutional arrangements facilitate their garnering of private
information about their borrower firms at lower cost than other investors,33
and banks have strong incentives to monitor these firms and influence managerial decisionmaking when necessary.
In its lending contract with the borrower, the lender includes a number
of covenants that constrain the borrower's financial, investment, and operating
activities.34 The bank also enjoys access to private information about the
borrower's business activities, including periodic reports from the borrower and
access to the borrower's management and books and records. The bank may
enjoy specialized expertise concerning the borrower's industry. A covenant
violation triggers the lender's right to cut off further credit to the borrower and
demand immediate repayment of outstanding debt." The borrower's management therefore has strong incentives to comply with its covenants.
Because of banks' special monitoring abilities, they are often effectively
delegated by other investors to monitor on their behalf. As detailed below,
banks enjoy covenant protection and information access that other investors
do not, but those other investors may free ride on the bank's monitoring and
price their capital accordingly.36 This theory of delegated monitoring enjoys
strong empirical support. For example, event studies consistently show that
positive abnormal stock returns accompany firms' public announcements of
bank loans.37 That is, the announcement of a bank loan is generally good
See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV.
33.
ECON. STUD. 393, 393 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY
ECON. 29, 36-38 (1985); see also Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kracaw, Information Production,
Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation,35 J. FIN. 863, 864 (1980) (theorizing that
financial intermediaries emerge to produce information because of the complementarity of information production, confidentiality, and the provision of transactional and other intermediary services).
34.
The structure of creditor governance is described more fully in Part II.
35.
Many loans to public companies take the form of a revolving loan, which allows the
borrower to repay and reborrow over the life of the loan. See infra Part II.A. Because firms rely on
the revolving loan to help manage their cash flows, cutting off further credit may be a severe sanction. See
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1229.
36.
See Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for
Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 836-37 (2008) (explaining the theory of delegated monitoring).
37.
See Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON.
217, 219 (1987); Myron B. Slovin, Shane A. Johnson & John L. Glascock, Firm Size and the
Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1058 (1992); Ronald
Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans, 48 J.
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news for the borrower firm's shareholders: The loan commits the bank to
monitor the borrower firm over the life of the loan, which may also redound
to shareholders' benefit.38 Similarly, bank monitoring may benefit bondholders. 9 Firms with preexisting bank loans are able to borrow more cheaply from
public debt markets than firms without. This advantage likely reflects the
value of bank monitoring, which reduces moral hazard in a way that bondholders alone cannot."

Relying in part on this crossmonitoring literature, a handful of legal
scholars have developed theories of lender governance, focusing primarily on
lenders' governance role as the borrower firm approaches distress. George
Triantis and Ron Daniels proposed a seminal model of interactive corporate
governance over a decade ago, arguing that stakeholders' exit decisions provide

FIN. 1507, 1511 (1993); Matthew T. Billett, Mark J. Flannery & Jon A. Garfinkel, The Effect of
Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return, 50 J.FIN. 699, 700 (1995). A related literature
suggests that nonbank private debt may also bring bank-like benefits to equity holders. These studies
show a positive stock price reaction to announcements of nonbank private debt placements, with
no statistical difference between announcements of bank debt versus nonbank private debt. See Billet,
et al., supra; Dianna C. Preece & Donald J.Mullineaux, Monitoringby FinancialIntermediaries: Banks
Versus Nonbanks, 8 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 193,199 (1994).
38.
See Sudha Krishnaswami, Paul A. Spindt & Venkat Subramaniam, Information Asymmetry,
Monitoring, and the Placement Structure of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 407, 409 (1999) (finding
that firms with greater growth prospects-and therefore greater debt-related moral hazard
problems-rely more heavily on private debt than public debt, and attributing this result to the
monitoring advantages of private debt); Scott L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, FurtherEvidence on
the Bank Lending Process and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON.
99, 101 (1989) (finding excess stock returns almost exclusively around the announcement of loan
renewals, but not new loans, and concluding that the value to shareholders comes not from the initial screening of prospective borrowers, but from private information the bank gleans during the
course of its relationship with the borrower, consistent with a monitoring theory).
This positive stock market reaction may also arise from a complementary source. The bank's decision
to extend credit may signal that it has positive private information about the firm-that is, the
bank resolves adverse selection problems for the stock market. See Best & Zhang, supra note 37;
Charles J. Hadlock & Christopher M. James, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, 57 J. FIN. 1383
(2002); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Cfferings and the
Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1986); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate
Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN.
ECON. 187 (1984).
The crossmonitoring benefits may run in favor of the bank as well. One study finds that bank debt
is cheaper for firms with publicly traded shares or investment-grade public debt outstanding. James
R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-MonitoringHypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1992).
39.
Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta & Ajay Patel, Bank Monitoring and the Pricing of
Corporate Public Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 435, 437 (1999). This study finds that the presence of a
preexisting bank loan reduces at-issue yield spreads for borrower firms' first public debt offerings by an
average of 68 basis points, which is both statistically and economically significant. Moreover, the
length of the bank/firm relationship is also statistically significant and negatively related to at-issue
yield spreads, which is again consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. See id.
40.
Id. at 436.
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valuable information to one another, thereby enhancing stakeholders' collective
ability to discipline management."
The reactions of a stakeholder are in many cases observable by others
who will in turn choose among their own set of available reactions.
Thus, governance in the modem corporation is akin to a system of
relays: stakeholders generate, collect, and analyze valuable information
on managerial slack, and then pass it to those stakeholders who are
better situated to take direct action to address the problem.42

The bank is the central monitor under this theory. Its specialized monitoring
abilities make it the low-cost monitor,43 and because the borrower and creditors, as a group, care about minimizing total monitoring costs, the borrower
willingly grants covenant protections to the bank that it may not grant other
creditors. The bank's contract rights and ongoing monitoring enable it both
to deter managerial slack and to detect it early. Upon detection, it may
either exit or intervene, even to the point of having management replaced.
In either case, the bank's action signals other stakeholders, who may also act
to protect their interests. While classic finance theory focuses on the conflicts between debt holders and equity holders," especially as the firm nears
distress, Triantis and Daniels remind us that the bank lender and other
stakeholders may have good reason to work toward the firm's recovery as a
going concern."
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen recently renewed the focus on
creditors' role in corporate governance, describing creditor control as the
"missing lever" in the corporate governance literature.46 They note the underappreciated role that banks and bank-loan covenants play in corporate
governance when a firm defaults. At that point, the bank's ability to discipline management is much greater than traditional governance devices.47
The bank may seize control by taking control of the firm's cash as part of a
41.
George G. Triantis & Ronald J.Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance,
83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995).
42.
Id. at 1079.
43.
For example, the bank enjoys better information than other creditors, and its business
model generates monitoring economies not available to other creditors. See id. at 1083-84.
44.
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 335.
For example, the prospect of repeat business with the firm may serve to align the bank's
45.
interests with those of equity holders as to investment policy and the firm's recovery. Triantis &
Daniels, supra note 41, at 1100-01.
46.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3.
47.
Compare, for example, bank monitoring with monitoring by shareholders-the firm's
traditional "owners." Banks enjoy far better information about the firm, and exercise far more
oversight and control over the firm's affairs, than shareholders. See id. at 1217. The corporate
charter is a short document; the loan agreement can easily exceed one hundred pages. See id.
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debt restructuring. Through a combination of a revolving credit facility,48
security interests in the borrower's cash and other assets, and modem cash
management technology, the lender obtains the ability to cut off the borrower's cash, an arrangement that gives the bank the finest vantage point
from which to monitor the borrower's business,49 as well as a veto over any
transaction or course of action not to the bank's liking.0
The other important control device for the bank is its leverage to cause
the replacement of management, a tactic that becomes available when the
borrower is in serious trouble and in need of a debt restructuring. Either
implicitly or explicitly, the lender may demand appointment of a turnaround
specialist, typically tasked as a Chief Restructuring Officer, to run the business,51 a power that shareholders almost never enjoy. Similarly, the market
for corporate control has only a weak disciplining effect on management
compared to bank discipline. Firms may erect takeover defenses to deter hostile takeovers, but once they take on private debt, they have little defense
against creditor control.52
While these important papers by Triantis and Daniels and Baird and
Rasmussen focus on the distress context, in a recent article I and my coauthors investigate the potential governance benefits of bank monitoring for
public companies more generally, with a focus not limited to the distress

48.

See infra note 79 and accompanying text.

49.

See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1226-30.

50.
Id. at 1227.
51.
Id. at 1233-34; see also Sadi Ozelge, The Role of Banks and Private Lenders in Forced
CEO Turnovers 5 (Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://ssm.comabstract=1031814 (finding that for an underperforming firm, an average level of bank
debt implies a 25 percent to 46 percent increase in the probability of forced CEO turnover compared
to a firm with no bank debt, and if the underperforming firm also violates a loan covenant, the result
is a 75 percent to 102 percent increase in the probability of forced CEO turnover).
52.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1244. Simply paying off the loan is typically not a
ready option. The authors note:
In theory, a business can rid itself of a creditor who presses too hard by repaying the loan,
but a business that encounters difficulty with a private creditor is likely to have trouble
replacing it with another. Any new lender has to worry about the private information held
by the existing lender. The existing lender may want to withdraw for reasons that are not
yet plain to outsiders. Any new lender is in any event bound to insist upon its own control
rights to protect itself.

Id.
Like Triantis and Daniels, Baird and Rasmussen resist the finance canon on the agency costs of
debt, which focuses on the conflicts among different investor classes that preclude efficient
investment when the firm is in distress. Baird and Rasmussen describe the incentives of the senior
lender-typically the bank-to pursue even risky projects to maximize firm value. Id. at 1246-47.
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context. Our evidence shows that the presence of bank loans improves firm
value for the benefit of shareholders, especially where agency costs are high.53
Aside from these few discussions, however, creditor governance has largely
been ignored in the corporate governance literature.
C.

Gauging Influence: Private Lenders vs. Directors

The remainder of the Article details the structure, function, and limits
of lender governance. As prelude to that discussion, I offer an organizing
framework to capture the significance of lender governance. I compare private
lenders with corporate directors for potential monitoring efficacy. The comparison seems apt. Directors are the traditional internal governance mechanism
for constraining managerial discretion, and not a few scholars and
policymakers lionize independent directors as the last best hope for closing
the gap between ownership and control.54
1.

Directors' Special Place in Corporate Governance Reform

Consistent• with
the shareholder focus of traditional governance, the
55
corporate director -especially the independent director-has long held a
special place in the hearts and minds of reformers as a model monitor of executives' behavior. 6 Directors are elected by shareholder vote, and independent
53.
Shepherd, Tung & Yoon, suprra note 12, at 996. Examining over 1,000 public firms for
the period 1990-2004, we find that the value-enhancing effect of bank monitoring is especially
strong for firms with substantial free cash flow, and that for a given level of management entrenchment, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring may improve firm value. Id.
54.
See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Perfomance of the
Large Publicly Traded Corporation,98 COLUM. L. REv. 1283, 1291 (1998) (singing the praises of "[ain
active and independent board of directors"); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the
Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 403 (2002) (noting that
a supermajority independent board is the norm).
55.
The company CEO and certain other executive officers will also serve as directors of their
company. However, as is customary, my use of the term "director" refers to outside directors-those
who are not also full-time employees of the company.
56.
See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of
Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1305, 1306 (2005) ("Since the beginning of the corporate
governance movement in the mid-1970s, enhancing the independence of corporate directors and
their function on the board has been at the center of corporate governance reform."); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Human Nature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 797-98 (2001) (describing the ascendancy of the
"monitoring"-board model of corporate governance, "where independence, skepticism, and a rigorous
loyalty to shareholder interests are the dominating norms"); see also Alan Palmiter, Reshaping the
Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (1989)
(advocating for a new duty of independence for directors in mixed-motive cases, a duty that explicitly
recognizes their important monitoring role).
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directors-autonomous from sometimes self-seeking managers-are ideally
situated to safeguard shareholders' interests.
The concept of independence is straightforward: An independent
director has no significant relationships with the firm or its management
that might affect her judgment." In addition to generalized hopes that independent directors might serve as vigilant monitors, corporate law tasks
independent directors to shoulder special burdens in cases of clear conflicts of
interest. Special litigation committees composed entirely of independent
directors must decide whether to pursue, settle, or dismiss derivative litigation
brought against other members of the board in the company's name.58 Recent
corporate governance reforms similarly place independent directors front and
center in the march toward improved corporate governance.
Following accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia,
and a host of other public companies, and the demise of the public
accounting firm Arthur Anderson, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX), 9 and the stock exchanges tightened their listing rules, all in an effort
to improve management accountability. These new rules demand that central
governance roles be reserved for independent directors. For public company

57.
See Ira M. Millstein et al., Ten Things That Every Director Should Know for 2004, Bus. &
SEC. LITIGATOR (Weil, Gotshal, & Manges LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2004, at 2-3, available at
http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/BSLJan4/$file/BSLJanO4.pdf (stating "by definition,
independent directors are outsiders who lack significant relationships to the company").
Reforms have made the requirements for independence more specific. For example,
post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing rules specify a number of
automatic disqualifications from independent status. A director is not independent if, among other
things, she (i) is an employee of the company; (ii) has an immediate family member who is an
executive officer; (iii) receives, or has an immediate family member who receives, more than
$100,000 per year in direct compensation from the company; (iv) is affiliated with or employed by
the company's present or former internal or external auditor. NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.02(b) (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/. NYSE listing rules
also require a three-year "cooling off" period, counting a director as independent only after three
years have elapsed following the termination of the affiliation(s) that tainted independent status. Id.
SOX adds its own specific independence requirements for audit committee members. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (2006) (prohibiting audit committee members from taking consulting, advisory or
compensatory fees from the issuer, and requiring that they not be an affiliated person of the issuer or
any subsidiary of the issuer).
58.
See Davis, supra note 56, at 1306 (critiquing courts' deference to special litigation
committees' dismissal decisions); see also Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation
Committees: An Empirical Investigation3, (Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 112, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 162858 (finding that special litigation committees do not uniformly
dismiss derivative suits).
59.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
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boards, a majority of directors are required to be independent.' In addition,
three crucial board committees are required to be comprised solely of independent directors: the audit committee,6 which hires and manages the firm's
outside auditor; the compensation committee,62 which sets executive compensation; and the nominating committee,63 which selects director nominees.
Given this faith in independent directors as fundamental corporate monitors, the degree of director influence on management may justifiably serve as a
useful benchmark against which to compare private lender influence.
2.

Comparing Influence

My comparison runs along four dimensions: information, incentives,
expertise, and enforcement powers. A putative monitor would seem to need
some measure of each in order to be effective,' and private lenders generally
do better across all four measures than do directors. Therefore, we can fairly
expect private lenders to be at least as effective as directors at monitoring, if
not more so.
To be clear, this analysis is not meant to suggest that private lender
monitoring is necessarily efficient or that it should replace traditional
shareholder-centered monitors. After all, lender concerns may not always
coincide with those of shareholders, and their actions may not always enhance
value. Lenders monitor for themselves; directors have fiduciary duties to
monitor on behalf of shareholders and the firm. So directors and lenders may
focus on different issues in their monitoring. The point instead is that private
lender influence is sufficiently serious that it deserves mainstream attention
from corporate governance policymakers.
Table 1 summarizes the comparisons.

60. See NYSE, supra note 57 § 303A.01; NASDAQ OMX GRP., INC., NASDAQ STOCK
MARKET RULES, EQUITY RULES § 5605 (b)(1)(2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/
NASDAQ/Main/.
61.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)).
62.
NYSE, supra note 57 § 303A; NASDAQ OMX GRP., INC., supra note 60, § 5605 (b).
63.
Id.
64.
Cf. Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Self-Regulation and
Government Oversight, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 687 (2005) (considering information, expertise,
incentives, and enforcement powers in modeling the efficacy of self-regulatory organizations in
securities regulation).
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TABLE 1

Governance
ehnism
echanism

Private Lender

Director

Factor
Continuous information
flow.

Discontinuous
information.

Incentives

Typically strong financial
incentives.

Weak, mixed incentives.

Expertise

Typical industry
expertise.

Industry expertise
unlikely.

Enforcement

Strong.

Varied.

Information. Private lenders enjoy important informational advantages
over directors generally.65 Private lending agreements and institutional
arrangements enable the lender to receive a continuous stream of information
concerning the borrower's operating performance and financial condition.66
For example, in addition to regular financial reports and wide discretionary
access to the borrower's books and records, properties, and management, a
private lender often enjoys the ability to monitor a borrower's cash flows in
real time as part of the lender's provision of cash management services to
the borrower. This window gives the lender constant updates on the
borrower's performance.67

Directors may receive the same financial reports as the lender, and while
they may theoretically be entitled to the same continuing stream of information the lender enjoys, they are unlikely to ask for it given their part-time
status, discussed below, and their inability to process it. Moreover, firm
managers may be tempted to manage the flow of information to directors in
ways that make managers look good. 6' Directors with demanding full-time
65.

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.

921, 938 (2007) (noting that "banks have better information than do directors").

66.

See infra Part II.B.

67.

See infra note 103-104 and accompanying text.

68.

JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN

60 (2008).
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jobs are not well positioned to gather and assess company information with
the intensity of a private lender.
Incentives. Banks and their lending officers have direct financial stakes
in policing borrowers carefully. Directors by contrast do not depend on their
director positions or director fees for their livelihood. They are basically parttime players who meet only a handful of times each year to consider firm
affairs. They may own shares in the borrower firm, but again, these stakes are
likely to be small relative to their total wealth. Directors may have some
reputational stake in appearing vigilant, and potential fiduciary duty liability
may offer some weak incentives to monitor. On the other hand, especially
for nonindependent directors, they may be beholden to managers for their
board positions, so their ability to check managerial excesses may be limited.
Granted, banks' incentive to monitor may depend on the firm's financial condition. A healthy and profitable firm is unlikely to draw much
scrutiny from its lender, who is far more concerned about downside risk than
upside performance. This is likely to be true for directors as well, though.
They are likely to give the CEO a free hand when the sailing is smooth.
Moreover, even a healthy and profitable firm may run afoul of a loan
covenant. As more fully explained in Part III,69 covenant violations are
common, and though they rarely portend distress, a violation does trigger
lender scrutiny and the possibility of tighter covenants.
Expertise. Private lenders typically cultivate industry expertise. Their
lending relationships with multiple firms in an industry generate scale economies
that enable them to price, monitor, and manage loans at lower cost than a
less focused lending pattern." By contrast, though it may seem counterintuitive, directors may not have much expertise in the firm's industry beyond what
they learn from being a director to the one firm.71 Instead, expertise within the
firm likely resides with executive officers and other full-time employees,72
who are typically thought of as the targets of monitoring, and not as the
69.

See infra Part III.B.3.

70.
See Randall S. Krozner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of
Interest, and Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 415, 436 (2001) (finding that banks specialize in lending to
industries in which they enjoy board participation).
71.
See Roel C. Campos, Remarks of SEC Commissioner,55 CASE W. RES. L REv. 527,534 (2005)
(complaining about the lack of industry expertise of many outside directors); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of
Outside Directorsas a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 914
(1996) (noting the problem of outside directors' lack of expertise); Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts
a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L 53, 71 (2008) (explaining how
independence rules make it difficult to use industry experts as outside directors).
72.
More generally, those with industry expertise are likely to be full-time employees of the
firm or one of its competitors. Employees of the firm's competitors, of course, are disqualified from
serving as directors of the firm.
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monitors themselves. Because of this insider expertise, directors are likely to
defer to the judgment of insiders on issues where expertise matters. This
dependence on insider expertise tends to weaken directors' monitoring efficacy.
Enforcement. Private lenders have fairly direct means for remedying
slack or mismanagement. Covenant violations are common, even among
well-run companies.73 A violation rarely signals financial distress. Instead,

lenders use covenants as trip wires to force managers to check in regularly.
The violation triggers a conversation between the lender and the firm's
management. To the extent it feels that certain changes should be made,
the lender has strong leverage to effect the change. Technically, a violation
triggers the lender's right to accelerate the loan and demand immediate
repayment. While lenders generally do not accelerate precipitously, the
option to accelerate upon a covenant violation gives the lender significant
leverage over management. Lenders are also subject to reputational constraints. They will wish to avoid developing reputations for unreasonable
interference with management, lest they lose future business to more
reasonable competitors. When market conditions favor borrowers over
lenders, for example, when liquidity is high and money is cheap, lenders may
feel constrained by market competition from pressing managers so aggressively that they refinance with a different lender.74 Conversely, however,
tighter credit conditions allow lenders to be more aggressive.
Directors, by contrast, have varied enforcement effectiveness. Boards
are susceptible to "capture" by management,75 as their involvement with
management causes a loss in objectivity and an allegiance to corporate policy
decisions that directors participated in formulating. Even a strong-willed
director with good monitoring intentions may be stymied by information and
expertise deficits from challenging insiders.76 Directors may also suffer collective action problems in maintaining a coalition to challenge management.7
In an extreme situation, a director might resign to protest a particular
management decision, but these cases are rare, and this sort of director resignation isa drastic step not often taken.
Along each of these four important dimensions-information, incentives, expertise, and enforcement-private lenders generally do better than
directors. Private lenders are therefore likely to perform at least as well as
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part IV.A.
MACEY, supra note 68, at 57-61.
See id. at 60-61.
Id. at 62.
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directors at monitoring managers and influencing their decisionmaking. The
next Part introduces the subject of private lender governance, explaining its
contractual and institutional structure.
1I.

THE STRUCTURE OF LENDER GOVERNANCE

How do private lenders influence managerial decisionmaking? This Part
explains the contractual and institutional structure of lender monitoring and
governance. Public company credit agreements almost invariably contain
covenants constraining managerial discretion in a number of areas. The
agreements also implement monitoring structures to generate a continuing
flow of private information to the lender concerning the borrower's ongoing
operations and financial condition. The scope and detail of the substantive constraints give some hint of the attention that lenders devote to borrower
oversight, and their multiple information-gathering arrangements confirm
lenders' ability to keep close tabs on their borrowers. Overall, the structure
offers potent tools for lenders to influence managerial decisionmaking when
necessary.
A.

Loans and Loan Covenants

While private loans to public companies may take a number of forms,
the predominant types are term loans and revolving loans. A term loan is
conceptually the simplest form of loan: The lender advances the entire principal amount of the loan at its inception, and the principal must be fully repaid
by the expiration of the loan's stated term. Interest accrues on the outstanding principal balance over the term of the loan and must typically be paid
regularly. 8
A revolving loan works like a typical consumer credit card account, insofar
as it allows the borrower to draw down amounts it may need periodically. The
revolving loan has an aggregate borrowing limit, and the borrower may borrow
and repay at its discretion, provided that total borrowings outstanding at any
given time do not exceed the stated credit limit. The borrower is required to
make periodic interest payments on the amount of debt outstanding, 9 and any
outstanding balance must be paid off entirely by the loan's termination date.
78.
Some term loans include an amortization schedule, which mandates a regular
periodic-typically monthly-payment of interest and principal. Over the life of the loan, these
periodic payments fully repay the principal and outstanding interest.
79.
The borrower typically pays for unborrowed money as well with a revolving loan, in the form of
a commitment fee calculated as a percentage of the unused commitment under the loan-that is, the
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Among public companies, the majority of private loans are revolving
loans.' ° Whether a loan is revolving or term, the standard agreement may
constrain the borrower firm's activities along a number of fronts. I describe
important constraints below.
1.

Financial Covenants

Bank loan agreements typically contain numerous financial benchmarks
that borrower firms are required to meet. As discussed more fully in the next
Part,"' these provisions serve not only as substantive constraints but also as trip
wires, which trigger lender scrutiny when hit.
Almost all credit agreements contain a covenant limiting the borrower's
latitude to incur additional debt," since additional debt increases the existing
lender's risk. This restriction is typically expressed as a cap on a debt-related
ratio, with some measure of debt as the numerator and a measure of earnings,
cash flow, or capitalization as the denominator."
In addition to limiting debt, cash flow is also a common focus of financial covenants, since a healthy cash flow enhances the borrower's ability
to repay. A straight cash flow covenant may take the form of an explicit
minimum amount of required cash flow over a specified period." A "coverage
borrowing limit less principal outstanding. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Credit Agreement Dated as of
July 12, 2002, Among CMS Energy Corporation et al., § 2.02(a) Uuly 12, 2002) (on file with author)
(describing a commitment fee).
80.
Florin P. Vasvari, Equity Compensation and the Pricing of Syndicated Loans 11-14 (Apr.
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.comabstract= 1128249.
One might be concerned that a private lender's monitoring incentives might wane for a revolving
loan where the outstanding principal balance is low or zero. However, it turns out that most
revolving loans are drawn promptly after their inception. See Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner,
Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J.ACCT. RES. 1091, 1104 n. 16 (2002).
81.
See infra Part III.B.3.
82.
Almost 90 percent of the samples in one study contain a debt-limiting covenant.
Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation
9 (Aug. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=962131.
83.
Over 79 percent of agreements contain a covenant of this variety. Id. at tbl.I. For example,
one credit agreement defines a leverage ratio:
"Leverage Ratio" means, on any date, the ratio of (a) Total Indebtedness as of such date to
(b) Consolidated EBITDA for the period of four consecutive fiscal quarters of the Company
ended on such date.
Further down, the agreement caps this ratio at 3:1.
SECTION 6.12. Leverage Ratio. The Company will not permit the Leverage Ratio as of
the last day of any fiscal quarter to exceed 3.00 to 1.00.
Credit Agreement Dated as of November 14, 2006, Among Amerisourcebergen Corporation et al.,
§§ 6.11, 6.12 (on file with author) [hereinafter, "ABC Credit Agreement"]. "EBITDA" is earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 9.
84.
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ratio" covenant is also common."5 This type of covenant requires the borrower to maintain its cash flow at or above a specified multiple of its total
interest expense.86
Lenders also care about net worth. A net worth covenant protects the
lender in case it ends up having to liquidate the borrower's assets to satisfy its
debt. This covenant sets a floor on the value of the borrower's net assets-the
margin by which the value of the firm's assets exceed its liabilities.
2.

Investment Constraints

Because overly aggressive investments may impair the borrower's ability
to repay its debt, private lenders often use explicit restrictions on capital
expenditures to "exert direct control over the financial policies of solvent
firms." 8 These restrictions are typically expressed as strict dollar limits or percentages of earnings or revenues, as the following illustrates: 9

85.
Over three-quarters of agreements contained a coverage ratio covenant. Id. at tbl.I. A
related study involving a subset of the same loans finds that 83 percent of loans contain a covenant
based on some measure of cash flow. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 22, tbl.lII.
86.
For example, the provision may require the borrower to maintain a coverage ratio of 2:1,
measured quarterly for the twelve-month period ending on the last day of each fiscal quarter. See,
e.g., $200,000,000 Amended and Restated Credit Agreement Dated as of July 27, 2005, Among
Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc. et al., § 8.01(k) (on file with author). Other fixed charges may also
be included in the denominator of this ratio.
A coverage ratio covenant also places an implicit limit on borrowing: additional debt may be
incurred only if the borrower can also generate sufficient additional cash flow to maintain the
required coverage.
Related to these benchmarks, meant to measure and preserve the borrower's ability to repay,
loan agreements also typically restrict the firm's latitude to pay dividends and other distributions to
equity holders. In addition, to ensure short-term liquidity, the loan agreement may require the
borrower to maintain a certain ratio of short-term assets to short-term liabilities. This is the current
ratio, which is calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. Current assets are those that
are reasonably expected to be converted to cash within one year-e.g., cash, accounts receivable,
inventory, and marketable securities. Current liabilities are the firm's debts that are due within one
year. In the Roberts & Sufi study, almost 15 percent of agreements contained some liquidity test.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 9.
87.
Almost half the credit agreements studied contained a net worth covenant. Id. Net worth
covenants also effectively impose operating performance requirements, since losses reduce net
worth dollar for dollar. Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Karen H. Wruck, Asset Liquidity, Debt
Covenants, and ManagerialDiscretion in Financial Distress: The Collapse of L.A. Gear, 64 J. FIN. ECON.
3, 22 (2002).
88.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 1; see Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 16, at 10 (finding
that 42 percent of firms faced a capital expenditure restriction during their 1996-2005 sample
period). Moreover, these restrictions respond directly to managers' potential overinvestment/asset
substitution tendencies. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 312 (discussing agency costs of
equity). Such constraints may be efficient. See infra Part III.C.2.
89.
Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 16, at 9.
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SECTION 6.23. Limitation on Capital Expenditures.
Capital Expenditures for each Fiscal Year shall not exceed the maxi-

mum levels as set forth below opposite such Fiscal Year:
Fiscal Year Ended:

Maximum Level

December 31, 2001

$205,000,000

December 31, 2002
December 31, 2003

$255,000,000
$305,000,00090

Other covenants indirectly constrain borrowers' ability to make investments. Use of loan proceeds is typically restricted.9" "Sweep" covenants require
the borrower to make loan prepayments upon the occurrence of certain
fundraising transactions-typically asset sales or securities issuances--or if the
borrower's hoard of cash simply exceeds a predetermined threshold. In effect,
whenever the borrower is holding too much free cash, a sweep covenant may
require that some portion of it be used to pay down the loan.92 These various
cash management and sweep provisions constrain the borrower's latitude to
make significant investments.
3.

Fundamental Changes

The bank effectively enjoys veto power over a number of significant
transactions that firm management might otherwise wish to pursue. For example, the firm's latitude to effect a change of control, sell or grant liens on
substantial assets, make major acquisitions, merge, or change the nature of its
business may all be explicitly restricted in the loan agreement.93 These provisions assure the lender that the fundamental nature of the business will not be
changed to its detriment.
B.

Institutional Practices and Information Access

In addition to the substantive constraints described above, private lenders
rely on a number of institutional practices to obtain current information about
the borrower's activities and financial condition in order to facilitate monitoring.
90.
Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, Dated as of June 29, 2001, Among Airborne
Express, Inc. et al., 75 (on file with author).
91.
See, e.g., ABC Credit Agreement, supra note 83, at § 5.08.
92.
One study of bank loans to public and private companies found that 62.5 percent had
asset sale sweeps; 46.2 percent had debt sweeps; and 45.9 percent had equity sweeps. Michael
Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants 11, tbl.1
(May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), http://ssm.conabstract=466240.
93.
See, e.g., ABC Credit Agreement, supra note 83, at §§ 6.03 (prohibiting fundamental
changes), 6.05 (prohibiting certain asset sales).
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Regular Reporting. A private lender typically requires its borrower to
provide a steady stream of information in the form of periodic financial and
operating reports.94 This information may be far more timely and detailed
than any regular public disclosure the borrower may be required to make.
Moreover, as earlier noted, the information banks enjoy rivals what directors receive in terms of frequency and detail. 95 With its periodic reports, the
firm must additionally certify its continuing compliance with each specific
condition and restriction contained in the credit agreement. For example, in
addition to producing quarterly financial statements, the firm may be required
specifically to certify its net worth, tangible assets, cash flow, or other
accounting benchmarks in order to confirm its ongoing conformity with individual financial covenants.96 Besides these regular reports, the borrower
obligates itself to provide notice to the bank of the occurrence of any of a
number of unfortunate incidents that might adversely affect the borrower's
creditworthiness-for example, material litigation, a default or potential default
on any material obligation, or receipt of a government notice of a material
regulatory violation.97 The lender also typically enjoys wide access to the
company's books and records and properties."8 Finally, the bank enjoys direct
access to the firm's management and independent accountants to address any
concerns it might have.'
Bankers on Board. The bank often has a representative on the borrower's
board of directors,1°° which improves the bank's access to information and offers
one more avenue for active monitoring. As a board member, the banker
obtains "soft" information that may be difficult to contract for ex ante. This
information access is more flexible than contractual reporting requirements and
can adapt more readily to changing conditions. It therefore economizes on
contracting and information production costs, to the benefit of both borrower
and lender.
This intimate knowledge of the borrower's operations also facilitates the
bank's development of expertise on the borrower's industry."' More generally,
94.
See, e.g., id. § 5.01(a), (b) (requiring quarterly financial statements).
95.
See supra Part I.C.2. Directors also ordinarily lack the incentives to demand all the
information theoretically available to them or the expertise to process it. See supra Part I.C.2.
96.
See, e.g., ABC Credit Agreement, supra note 83, at § 5.01(c) (requiring periodic certification of compliance with fixed charge ratio and leverage ratio covenants).
97.
See, e.g., id. § 5.02.

98.

See, e.g., id. § 5.06.

99.
See, e.g., id.
See Krozner & Strahan, supra note 70, at 416 (noting that one-third of large U.S. firms
100.
have a banker on the board of directors).
101.
Consistent with this industry expertise theory, evidence suggests that banks specialize in
lending to industries in which they are represented on boards. Id. at 436.

140

57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 115 (2009)

private lenders often specialize in lending to particular industries or industry
segments. Industry expertise enables lenders to more precisely evaluate the
ongoing credit risk of individual borrower firms and to distinguish individual
underperformance from industry effects.' °2
Following the Money. Banks and other private lenders typically offer cash
management, check clearing, and other financial services to their borrowers,
who are often required to maintain their deposit accounts with their private
lender. 3' This arrangement enables the lender to closely follow its borrower's
aggregation and uses of cash in real time, giving the lender a clear window on
the borrower's business activity.'0
Short Maturities for Reassessing Credit Quality. Lending practices also
facilitate monitoring. Private lending is ordinarily only short or medium
term,"5 which means that borrowers must periodically renew their bank lending arrangements. This gives the lender continual fresh opportunities to
reexamine its borrowers' creditworthiness, and also gives borrower managers
incentive to maintain creditworthiness.
1II.

THE DYNAMICS OF LEVERAGE

Drawing on the preceding structural account of the contractual and
institutional setting for lender governance, this Part explains the dynamics of
102.
Borrowers also gain from having bankers on board. Good information flow to the bank
likely improves the firm's access to credit from that bank. Interestingly, while most banks represented on boards are lenders to the firm, they are typically not the firm's main lender. This probably
results from potential conflicts of interest and lender liability concerns. Id. at 431. Consistent with
this theory, bankers are more likely to be on boards of firms where conflicts are less likely-typically
larger, more stable firms with high proportions of tangible assets and low levels of short-term debt.
Id. at 417. A banker with industry expertise may also be a more useful adviser to the borrower firm.
Finally, a banker on board may signal the bank's faith that the firm is unlikely to go into distress,
since the firm's distress could create conflicts of interest and lender liability issues for the bank. Id. at
419; cf. Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, When Banks are Insiders: Evidence From the Global
Syndicated Loan Market (Dec. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that for
global syndicated loans, a bank's status as an insider to the borrower firm mutes primarily to the
bank's benefit).
103.
Fama, supra note 33, at 37-38; Amoud W. A. Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We
Know, 9 J. FIN. INTERMED. 7, 11 (2000).

104.
See Fisher Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323,326
(1975) (explaining the informational advantages for a lender from maintaining its borrower's deposit
account); Fama, supra note 33, at 37-38.
105.
The predominant liabilities for banks are short-term deposits. To match the timing of
their assets and liabilities, banks tend to avoid long-term loans. In one study of 1,000 loans to public
companies, 73 percent of the loans had stated maturity of five years or less. Roberts & Sufi, supra
note 15, at tbl.I, Panel B. Invariable renegotiation prior to stated maturity makes the effective
maturity even shorter. Average effective maturity is less than one-half of the original stated maturity.
Id. at 2.
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lender governance. It draws on existing empirical research to show the pervasiveness of private lenders' influence on managerial decisionmaking. The
banking relationship involves more than a static set of contract terms: It is a
durable and adaptable association that responds to the changing conditions
under which the borrower's business operates, and banks influence borrower
managerial decisions through the various stages of this relationship. In addition to standard covenant constraints that are tailored to the perceived risks
of the borrower at a loan's inception, explicit contingency provisions and
renegotiation respond to the borrower's changing circumstances over time.
Renegotiation is the norm. It is often triggered by a covenant violation,
which is commonplace, 6 and renegotiation often involves additional curbs on
managerial discretion. Over the course of this dynamic relationship, lenders
commonly influence-sometimes even dictate-critical corporate policy
choices, especially as to financial and investment policy and management turnover. Lender influence in these areas curbs risktaking by management, which
may be value enhancing for borrower firms.
A.

Durability of the Banking Relationship: The Certainty of Renegotiation

Renegotiation of private credit agreements is not only common; it is the
rule. 07 Moreover, credit agreements are structured specifically with renegotiation in mind.'0 8 Almost all credit agreements are renegotiated before stated
maturity-after only 44 percent of the original term has elapsed, on average."
According to one private lending officer, "lenders generally view the Loan
Agreement as a living document destined to be modified periodically to take
account of changing circumstances."'' 0

See infra Part III.B.3.
106.
107.
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 1-2.
See Charles Kahn & Gur Huberman, Default, Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation, LAW
108.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 49, 51 (explaining that a credit agreement puts enormous
negotiating leverage increditor's hands, not necessarily to enable the creditor to foreclose but to
extract value from the borrower under conditions of information asymmetry); see also Gur Huberman
& Charles Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 471
(1988) (modeling the use of unreasonable clauses in contracts to structure renegotiation under
conditions of information asymmetry).
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 8. For example, 96 percent of contracts with stated
109.
maturity exceeding three years are renegotiated. Id. As high as this percentage is, it accounts for
only those renegotiations that modify a major contract term such as principal, interest spread, or
maturity. Id. at 7 n.4. Over 90 percent of private credit agreements with stated maturity exceeding
one year are renegotiated. Id. at 2.
July-Aug.
Edward D. Zinbarg, The Private Placement Loan Agreement, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
110.
1975, at 35 (discussing private placement lenders).
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In addition to its frequency, renegotiation also works enormous changes

to the original agreement. Consider three central contract terms: maturity,

credit amount, and interest rate spread."' The absolute value of renegotiated
changes to contract maturity averages 64 percent." 2 Changes in amount
average 43 percent."3 Changes to interest rate spread average 40 percent."4
These large averages, together with the near certainty of renegotiation, imply
that over the course of the banking relationship, significant modifications to
the fundamental terms of private lending agreements are routine.
Renegotiation may be triggered by the borrower's violation of a loan covenant. " ' As more fully described below, technical violations are quite common.
They rarely lead to default, financial distress, or loan acceleration, 6 but lenders
often impose additional constraints on borrowers following violations.'
The likelihood of renegotiation is also more sensitive to subsequent
changes in credit quality when the initial contract contains contingency provisions based on specific measures of credit quality. For example, the original
111.
Bank loans typically carry a floating interest rate, a rate that varies with prevailing credit
market conditions. The contract rate is set as a "spread," say 1 percent, over a benchmark or
reference rate-a widely followed interest rate that reflects general credit market conditions. The
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is one widely used reference rate in bank credit
agreements. LIBOR is based on the interest rates at which London banks lend to each other on an
unsecured basis. The actual interest rate the borrower pays at any given time is the sum of the
spread and the reference rate, and it varies with changes in the reference rate. The interest rate spread
generally reflects the riskiness of the loan.
112.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 2. Average maturity for the sample is 3.3 years. The
average renegotiated change in maturity is 2.1 years. Id.
113.
Id. The average principal amount for the sample is $450 million. The average renegotiated change is $193 million. Id.
114.
Id. The average interest spread for the sample is 162 basis points. The average renegotiated change in spread is 64 basis points. Id.
115.
According to Roberts and Sufi, fewer than 18 percent of renegotiations involve a
covenant violation or payment default. Id. However, there is some possibility that they may be
undercounting violations. They rely on SEC filings to determine whether a violation triggered the
renegotiation. Specifically, they rely on the notes to financial statements included in Form 10-K and
Form 10-Q periodic reports to indicate covenant breaches. See id. at 8 n.5 (referencing Roberts &
Sufi, supra note 82, for data collection methods); Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 6-8. However,
technical violations that are routinely waived may not be captured here. Disclosure is required only
for a covenant breach that exists at the date of the most recent balance sheet being filed and that has
not been cured. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08 (2008). For similar reasons, only the most serious violations
are likely to be detected with this approach. See Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1095 (noting
that a renegotiation and cure would be fairly easy to accomplish except when "circumstances are
sufficiently serious as to preclude any form of favorable renegotiation").
Even a technical violation gives the lender the legal right to accelerate the loan. While
acceleration for a technical violation is unlikely, it may still offer the lender some leverage in
renegotiation. The statement in the text still holds, however. If undercounting involves only immaterial
violations, then the observed magnitudes of typical renegotiated changes remain quite staggering.
116.
See infra Part lll.B.3.
117.
See id.
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agreement may include a provision that adjusts the interest rate over the life of
the loan based on subsequent changes in the borrower's cash flow.' A credit
agreement with this so-called "performance pricing" provision is more likely to
be renegotiated following a change in cash flow than an agreement without
this contingency." 9 This finding helps to capture the relational quality of the
lending agreement. It also stands at odds with standard incomplete contracts
theory. Standard theory posits that renegotiation is costly, and that parties
avoid such costs by drafting more complete contracts-contracts that address
more future states of the world by specifying contract outcomes under those
various states.' 20 Private lending agreements appear to be doing just the
opposite. The sensitivity of renegotiation to initial contract contingencies-changes in cash flow, in our example-suggests that rather than attempting to

avoid renegotiation, the parties include contingencies in anticipation of it.
Borrower and lender recognize ex ante the importance of the contingency, and
they contract on the contingency to allocate bargaining power in different
states of the world in order to structure any renegotiation.12
Finally, renegotiation rarely leads to a change of lender,' suggesting the
importance and durability of the lender-borrower relationship and the significance of the parties' relationship-specific investment.' From the beginning of
their lending arrangement, then, borrower and lender foresee a relationship
that will change but endure. They attempt in the initial contract to anticipate
future changes in credit quality to some extent, not to avoid renegotiation but
to structure it. Renegotiation is expected, and it may lead to very significant
As I discuss below, this "performance pricing" feature is now the norm. See infra Part III.B.2.
118.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 3. More specifically, a decline in cash flow will trigger
119.
an unfavorable renegotiation, reducing the borrower's credit and increasing its interest rate. Id.
120.
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1991) (describing the standard view of incomplete contracts);
Gur Huberman & Charles Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 471, 471 (1988) (describing the standard bounded rationality explanation for incomplete
contracting and subsequent renegotiation).
121.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 3-4.
122.
In the Roberts & Sufi study, only 11 percent of renegotiated loans led to a change of
lender or lead arranger. When we include loans that mature, the number drops to 8.5 percent. Id. at 15.
See Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Ann's
123.
Length Debt, 47 J.FIN. 1367 (1992); Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateralas
Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995). This account is also consistent with the loan market
literature showing that lead banks rarely sell their positions. Instead, they have a reputational stake
in preserving their borrower relationships. This helps explain the counterintuitive result that
syndicate size has no effect on the likelihood of renegotiation. See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at
23. It also helps explain results showing that banks remain special-their monitoring role is valued
by shareholders-even after the advent of active loan markets. See Amar Gande & Anthony
Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans? 9 (Oct. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=873353.
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changes in the fundamental terms of the original agreement. In all likelihood,
borrower and lender will stick together through subsequent changes, anticipated or not. This is not to suggest their interests will necessarily coincide, but
it does suggest that given the value of their relationship-specific investment,
they will jointly manage contingencies in their relationship.
Given the durability of this relationship and its adaptability, it makes
sense that banks might regularly influence firm governance from its inception
and throughout the course of the banking relationship.
B.

The Stages of Lender Influence

This Section explains the various stages of lender influence over the
course of its relationship with the borrower firm. The covenant constraints
in the initial loan agreement explicitly curb managers' discretion from the
inception of the lending relationship. Built-in contingency provisions also
offer finely tuned incentives affecting managers' decisionmaking over the life
of a loan. Finally, subsequent covenant violations trigger lender scrutiny and
the possibility of further constraints on managerial discretion.
1.

Initial Covenant Settings: Controlling Agency Costs

Here I discuss the theory and practice of initial covenant settings.
Empirical studies show that the structuring of initial covenants responds to
firm characteristics that affect credit risk, and that managers alter their
behavior in response to covenant constraints. Lender influence commences
from the very beginning of the lending arrangement.
Financial covenants are pervasive."2 Among other fears, lenders worry
that once credit is extended, firm managers may favor their own interests or
the interests of equity holders over those of creditors.125 Managers might, for
instance, substitute risky projects for more conservative ones, since in the
1 26
presence of debt, equity holders do better with the former than the latter.

124.

One study of public companies' credit agreements from 1996-2005 found that almost 97

percent included at least one financial covenant. See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 9. Another
study using a sample period from 1995-2001 found that for loans with expected maturity of one
year or more, the average loan contained three financial covenants. See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher
James, The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants 8 (Nov. 30, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=959393 (discussing the
prevalence of sweep covenants).
125.
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 335; Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of
CorporateBorrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcON. 147,155 (1977); Smith & Warner, supra note 21, at 118.
126.
This is the problem of asset substitution. See Smith & Warner, supra note 21, at 118-19.
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Managers might even spend free cash on negative net present value projects, 27 either to build empires for their own benefit or to improve equity
holders' upside returns. The finance literature has identified situations in
which these agency costs may be most troublesome. Financial distress, for
example, heightens the conflict between debt and equity.
Consistent with this literature, covenant structure responds to these
perils.'28 Firms with greater risk of financial distress-smaller, more highly
levered, more volatile firms, and firms with highly liquid assets-are more
likely to have covenants in their lending agreements." By contrast, loans
to firms with a higher ratio of tangible assets to total assets are less likely to
This makes sense as tangible assets are easier to value
include covenants.'
and easier to liquidate than intangible assets in the event of the firm's default.
Firms with intangible assets and growth opportunities are riskier because
realization of the value of these opportunities depends on discretionary future
investment by the firm.' Specific covenants address this sort of risk: high
growth firms are more likely to attract demands for security, financial ratio
covenants, and covenants restricting dividends.'32 More generally, private
lenders set covenants fairly tightly relative to the variability of the underlying accounting measure, 33 adjusting covenant "slack" to account for this
This is overinvestment. See Elazar Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and
127.
Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J.FIN. ECON. 765, 766 (1990).
128.
Equity holders accede to these covenants because absent such protections, lenders will
demand a higher price for their credit for having to bear the risks of these opportunistic maneuvers.
129.
Bradley & Roberts, supra note 92, at 27 (analyzing commercial loans made from 1993-2001,
as reflected in Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database). Similar results are obtained using
syndicate size as a proxy for risk: there is a positive correlation between syndicate size and the inclusion
of covenants. Id. Loans to firms with greater cash flow volatility are more likely to include dividend
restrictions and to require collateral. Id. at 17.
Id. at 19 tbl.6.
130.
Myers, supra note 125, at 150.
131.
Bradley & Roberts, supra note 92, at 19, tbl.6 (relying on the market-to-book ratio as a
132.
measure of growth). Collateral reduces the lender's downside risk. Financial covenants cabin the
borrower's risktaking. The restriction on dividends addresses the problem of debt-induced
underinvestment. Managers may shun efficient investments whose returns would be enjoyed
disproportionately by creditors rather than equity holders. Dividend restrictions partially address the
underinvestment problem by keeping cash in the company. Myers, supra note 125, at 160.
Compared to firms without significant growth opportunities, high growth firms are more likely to
suffer this harm to firm value to creditors' detriment.
Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1093. The study investigates current ratio and net
133.
worth covenants. The current ratio is calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities.
Current assets are those that are reasonably expected to be converted to cash within one year-for
example, cash, accounts receivable, inventory, and marketable securities. Current liabilities are the
firm's debts that are due within one year. Net worth is the amount by which the value of the firm's
assets exceeds the amount of their liabilities.
For the current ratio covenant, mean and median covenant slack at loan inception-the
distance from the covenant threshold to the actual measure-are 0.80 and 0.52, respectively, while
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variability for each borrower.' Tighter covenants are also associated with
lower borrowing costs,' consistent with the proposition 1that
lenders value
36
these stricter limits and their effects on borrower behavior.
Covenants also likely affect managers' behavior. Despite the fact that
technical covenant violations are common and do not typically result in
punitive lender action, managers cannot count on this. A violation often
triggers the lender's legal right to demand immediate repayment of the entire
debt, and even though acceleration is unlikely, a violation might always cause
some curtailment of managerial discretion through the bank's intervention. 131
Even for healthy firms in the best of situations, there is the hassle factor: a
violation requires managers to explain. It triggers review by the bank and
may impose additional reporting burdens on borrower management, which
is put to the task of defending its forecasts and strategies."' All this takes
time away from running the company. Banks also often charge a fee for a
waiver or modification of the loan. The more intensive monitoring and
covenant constraints that accompany private debt may even cause some
healthy firms to switch from private to public debt.3 9 Managers have incentive to comply.
Though measuring the effects of loan covenants on managerial behavior
may be a bit tricky, 140 studies tend to confirm that covenants have real
their standard deviations are 0.53 and 0.32, based on quarterly data. Given that the average maturity
of loans in the sample is approximately eleven quarters, this represents a generally tight covenant.
Similarly, for the net worth covenant, mean and median slack at inception are 3.8 percent and 6
percent, respectively, while their standard deviations are 4.8 percent and 3.2 percent. Id. at 1105-06.
134.
Id. at 1106-07.
135.
Demiroglu & James, supra note 124, at 24 (using all-in-drawn spread as a measure of
borrowing costs).
136.
Tighter covenants may also simply reflect the lender's higher confidence in the borrower's
future performance. See id. at 5 (noting that borrowers and lenders set covenant thresholds that they
expect can be achieved). Stock price reactions to public announcement of loans are also larger for
loans with tighter covenants. Id. at 20. As with the association with lower borrowing costs, this
stock price effect could be explained either as a signal of private information-evidencing the
lender's special confidence in the borrower's future performance-or a commitment to future
performance by the firm's managers, which credits covenants with real ex post effects.
137.
Managers value their financial flexibility. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey,
The Theory and Practiceof CorporateFinance: Evidence From the Field, 60 J. FiN. ECON. 187, 210 fig.5
(2001) (finding that "financial flexibility" is the single most important factor CFOs consider when
deciding debt policy).
138.
Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1096 (describing the hassle factor).
139.
See Stuart C. Gilson & Jerold B. Warner, Private Versus Public Debt: Evidence From
Firms That Replace Bank Loans With Junk Bonds (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 140093.
140.
Measuring the effects of loan covenants is important because it is at least conceptually
possible that lenders and borrowers set covenant thresholds merely to anticipate the borrower's future
performance. In that case, rather than setting constraints, covenants would be a formality, exerting
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effects.' 4' When we look at firm performance following a loan's inception, we
find some telling patterns. Comparing quarter-end accounting measures with
the associated covenants, one study finds an unusually small number of loan
quarters with borrower performance slightly beyond covenant thresholds-that
is, in violation-while an unusually large number cluster just shy of the
violation point.'42 In other words, there is a significant discontinuity in
the distribution of firms' performance on accounting measures constrained by
covenants.' Moreover, the discontinuous pattern becomes more pronounced
over the life of the loan. This longitudinal dimension is important. Clustering
in general, while consistent with the view that covenants constrain managers,
does not necessarily rule out the anticipatory contracting explanation-that
covenants are set in order to anticipate the borrower's future performance, but
not to constrain it.'" After all, lenders set tight covenants, so we would
expect to see some clustering near the covenant threshold. Anticipatory
contracting could plausibly account for clustering generally or discontinuity
in the quarters immediately following the loan's inception. However, the
persistence and increased prominence of this discontinuous pattern in a loan's4
later years is difficult to explain as an artifact of anticipatory contracting. 1
Instead, the pattern suggests that covenants146have real bite: firms attempt to
manage in response to covenant constraints.
2.

Built-in Contingency

In addition to setting fixed constraints, the initial credit agreement
often accounts for contingencies with various conditional features. The most

no real influence on firm managers, except perhaps in extreme cases. The commonplace of covenant
violations-and lenders' typical waiver of violations-may suggest that managers worry little about
covenants, and that covenants do little to constrain managerial discretion.
141.
The effects are especially clear in the investment policy context. See infra Part III.C.2.
142.
Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1111-12 (investigating current ratio and net
worth covenants).
143.
If, for example, a net worth covenant had no effect on managers' behavior, one would
expect to see a smooth distribution of firms' net worth across the covenant limit. The clustering just
shy of the covenant limit suggests that managers are managing with an eye to remaining in compliance
with the covenant.
144.
See supra note 143.
145.
Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1112.
146.
The data make it impossible to determine, however, whether firms are engaging in "real"
management or accounting management-are managers improving firm performance or only playing
with the numbers? One might expect that using accounting management to remain in compliance with covenant constraints would be difficult for a chronically poorly performing firm to sustain
over time. So the finding of pronounced discontinuity in the distribution of firms' performance on
accounting measures in loans' later years suggests that some real management is probably going on.
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common contingencies are performance pricing, "build-up" provisions, and
use of a borrowing base. These built-in contingencies seek not only to constrain but to channel managerial decisionmaking over time. They operate
over the life of the loan, even absent poor firm performance, covenant violations, or financial distress.
Performancepricing. Performance pricing ties interest rate spreads to specific
financial performance metrics, adjusting to changes in credit risk over the life
of a loan.'47 Among public companies, performance pricing is now standard. 4 s
Pricing provisions are quite detailed and sophisticated. They typically
anticipate a wide range of changes to credit risk and offer price incentives
accordingly, with initial pricing typically set toward the expensive end of the
spectrum and price reductions to encourage performance improvements.'49 In
one study, the range of interest rate spreads from the top to the bottom of the
pricing grid averaged 90 basis points, 5 ' a relatively broad range given the size
of the mean initial loan spread of 175 basis points."'
A complementary covenant typically accompanies the pricing grid."2
This associated covenant sets a constraint on the same performance measure
used in the pricing grid-say, the debt-to-cash flow ratio-setting a tight limit
just past the expensive end of the grid.'53 This combination of pricing grid
and related covenant, with initial pricing at the expensive end of the grid,
suggests that the arrangement intends to incentivize improved performance
with discounted pricing, while catching credit deterioration rather quickly

147.
The most commonly used performance measures are debt-to-cash flow ratios and credit
ratings. See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 10.
148.
Roberts and Sufi find performance pricing in about 73 percent of loans in their sample.
See id. at 10.
149.
Anne Beatty, Ilia D. Dichev & Joseph Weber, The Role and Characteristics of AccountingBased Performance Pricing in Private Debt Contracts (June 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=318399. According to this study, most performance
pricing grids contain between four and six levels, with some containing up to nine pricing levels. Id.
at 13 fig.1 (focusing only on debt/EBITDA-based pricing grids).
150.
Id. at 2. A basis point is one one-hundredth of a percentage point. One hundred basis
points equals one percent.
Id. at 13. Similarly, among agreements with performance pricing based on debt-to-cash
151.
flow ratios, the range of this metric over the entire grid averages 1.64, which again seems relatively
broad given that the mean initial setting for the debt-to-cash flow ratio is 3.60, with an interquartile
range of about 2.00. Id. The interquartile range is the difference between the 25th and 75th
percentile for the initial setting of the debt-to-cash flow ratio.
152.
The pattern of performance pricing with a same-variable covenant suggests that the two
are complements rather than substitutes. Id. at 15. Further testing confirms their complementarity.
Id.at 18.
153.
Id.at 14. The typical covenant is set within one pricing level of the very top of the grid. Id.
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when the firm falters. This upside-focused pricing variability offers managers54a
transparent reward structure, spurring improvement that leads to cheaper debt.'
Contingent interest costs offer managers powerful incentives to improve
performance during the life of the loan. Lower interest costs will improve the
firm's profitability and leave managers with more discretion. Poor performance and higher interest costs will hinder profitability, increasing the odds of
lender intervention down the road.
Other Contingencies: Build Up and Borrowing Base. Besides performance
pricing, private credit contracts sometimes include other contingencies such
as a "build up" or a borrowing base.
A build up provision causes a covenant threshold to ratchet upward over
the life of the loan. The covenant becomes more stringent over time, based
on a fixed schedule or a formula linked to the firm's future performance. For
example, a leverage covenant may be set initially at 50 percent, ratcheting
down to 40 percent after the first year, and so on.'55 Or a net worth covenant
may set a specific dollar threshold at loan inception, with future upward
adjustments based on the firm's positive net income or any issuance of new
securities. 156 Build up imposes a stick that forces future improvement by
managers, who otherwise suffer the consequences of a covenant violation. Build
up may also be useful in signaling firm managers as to the lender's expectations concerning future performance.
A borrowing base is sometimes used in secured loans. The arrangement
ties credit availability under the loan to the value of the loan's specified
collateral-typically accounts receivable and/or inventory. This is the

154.
It also improves on contracting efficiency. Specifying rewards upfront for later improvements in credit risk reduces renegotiation costs and the lender's prepayment risk, to the ultimate
benefit of both borrower and lender. Id. at 7-8; Paul Asquith, Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber,
Performance Pricingin Bank Debt Contracts,40 J. AccT'G & ECON. 101,104 (2005).
Pricing grids sometimes also contemplate deterioration in credit quality, increasing interest
spreads for greater credit risk. This type of pricing grid is more prevalent with financially stronger
firms, where deterioration in credit quality is less likely to lead to default and therefore may be priced
more accurately ex ante. Beatty, Dichev & Weber, supra note 149, at 22-23. This prespecified
schedule of increased interest rates may tend to discourage poor performance at lower cost than
traditional covenants, which do not compensate the lender for small increases in risk from poor
performance that falls short of a covenant violation. Consistent with this, borrowers are generally
compensated for price-increasing grids with lower initial interest rates. See Asquith, Beatty &
Weber, supra, at 104 (finding that initial rates are almost 26 basis points lower for loans with
price-increasing grids). Negative incentives may be quite powerful. Interest spreads might double,
for example, as cash flow and credit quality deteriorate. See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 3.
155.
See Demiroglu & James, supra note 124, at 7 n.11.
156.
See Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1103.

150

5 7 UCLA LAW REVIEW 115 (2009)

prototypical working capital line.'57 The value of inventory and accounts is
likely to fluctuate, and may depend on seasonal patterns of the borrower
firm's business activity. While the credit line offers the borrower the flexibility to borrow only what it needs, use of the borrowing base helps assure the
lender that at any given time, the amount of credit outstanding is consistent
with the borrower's activity level. With the borrower's growth, credit availability increases to finance such growth. On the other hand, reduced activity
will cause the borrower's financing to dry up.

Each of these conditional arrangements-performance pricing, build up,
and borrowing base-spurs managers to improve firm performance, based on
a specified accounting measure.158 These incentives are in place from the
outset of the lending relationship, affecting managerial decisionmaking even
when the firm performs well.
3.

Honor in the Breach: Covenant Violations

Not surprisingly, poor performance and covenant violations typically cause
lenders to monitor their borrowers more closely and perhaps to actively intervene in managerial decisionmaking. Contrary to much of the conventional
wisdom, however, financial covenant violations are common, and they do
not typically presage financial distress,'59 though they may trigger some lender
response. Over a ten-year period, according to one study, a quarter to a third
of all public companies will violate a financial covenant,' 0 and this may be
a lower bound, as methodological constraints suggest that many technical

157.
Roberts & Sufi find borrowing bases used in 20 percent of their loan sample. See Roberts
& Sufi, supra note 15, at 10.
158.
In addition, as earlier discussed, these contingencies affect renegotiation by altering the
default option and shaping bargaining power. See supra Part III.A.
159.
See Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1093; Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts,
How Does Financing Impact Investment?: The Role of Debt Covenants 2 (AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings
Paper, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=854324.
160.
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 8-9 (finding that in a random sample of 1894 public
companies between 1996 and 2005, more than one quarter violated a financial covenant, and for
companies with an average leverage ratio of at least 5 percent, the fraction was almost one-third); see
also Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1093 (finding that with a Dealscansample of private loans from
1986-99, violations occur in about 30 percent of all loans); Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 8-9, 11
(finding that 37 percent of firms subject to a current ratio covenant and 31 percent of firms subject to a
net worth covenant during the period 1994-2005 committed a violation of the respective covenant).
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violations may go undetected. 6 ' One lending officer at a prominent insurance company reports that in a given year, the company will receive on average
one request for a covenant modification for each loan on its books. 62 In any
event, "covenant violations are relevant for a large fraction of public firms.' 63
Violations rarely lead to payment default or acceleration of the loan. A
violation will trigger the lender's scrutiny, and firm managers may be tasked
to justify the firm's strategies and forecasts."M Ultimately, however, the lender
most often waives the violation.6 6 According to one lender's report, more
than 95 percent of requests for covenant modification are granted with no
quid pro quo-"the vast majority of corporate requests are perfectly reasonable and do not increase [lender] risk materially.""
The second most likely lender response is to impose additional constraints on the borrower. 61 More drastic measures such as a reduction in credit,
an increase in interest rate, or a requirement of additional collateral are less
likely, 68 though of course, if the firm's slide continues, the bank will resort to
these and other more aggressive measures. 69
161.
Methodological constraints make it difficult to detect every violation. Some studies rely
on text searching of SEC filings, but not all covenant breaches are significant enough to warrant
SEC reporting. See supra note 115. Other studies compare initial covenant thresholds as reported in
Dealscan with subsequent accounting performance as reflected in Compustat. See Dichev & Skinner,
supra note 80, at 1104; Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 10. But loan modifications receive only
limited coverage in Dealscan, so violations could be over or underreported. See Dichev & Skinner,
supra note 80, at 1094; Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 10.
162.
See Zinbarg, supra note 110, at 35.
163.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 2. The prevalence of violations is generally consistent
across industries. Id. at 9, 53 tbl.I. The trade-wholesale category isexceptionally high, experiencing
violations at almost a 35 percent rate. Id. at 53 tbl.I. Not surprisingly, the likelihood of violation
decreases with firm size and credit rating. Id. at 9-10, 53 tbl.l.
164.
See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
165.
V. Gopalakrishnan & Mohinder Parkash, Borrower and Lender Perceptions of Accounting
Information in Corporate Lending Agreements, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 13, 20 (1995) (surveying chief
financial officers of Fortune 500 companies, chief lending officers of the largest 100 banks, and the
heads of private placement departments at the top 100 insurance companies, with more than 95
percent of both borrowers and lenders indicating a medium or high probability of a waiver).
166.
Zinbarg, supra note 110, at 35.
167.
Seventy-five percent of borrowers and 59 percent of lenders indicate a medium to high
probability of additional constraints. Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, supra note 165, at 20, 21 tbl.3.
168.
See id.; Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 34-35, 63 tbl.IX (noting from a small sample of
SEC filings for covenant-violating firms that 24 percent of violations resulted in reduced credit
availability, 15 percent resulted in increases in interest spread, and 7 percent resulted in the lender
requiring additional collateral; and that in the aggregate, 32 percent of lenders took at least one of
these actions).
169.
The most drastic remedies of termination of the agreement and acceleration of the debt
are, of course, the least common. Over 76 percent of Fortune 500 borrowers and more than 90
percent of their lenders assign a zero or low probability to these outcomes. Gopalakrishnan & Parkash,
supra note 165, at 20-21 & tbl.3.
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Covenants are used primarily, then, not as a device to force the borrower's
immediate repayment of the loan, even though the lending agreement
provides for that remedy. Instead, covenants act as trip wires that signal the
need for creditor attention. When the wire is tripped, the lender steps in to
update its information about the borrower. The lender will communicate
with management and examine the firm's financial position and internal
forecasts. In most cases, tripping the wire does not ultimately result in any
punitive response by the creditor. But it does command the lender's attention
and gives the lender the option to act, depending on what its investigation
shows. In the run-of-the-mill case, the lender will waive the violation and may
impose additional constraints to account for the new situation.
These routine interactions, typically triggered by a covenant violation or
perhaps a borrower's entreaty when a violation is imminent, offer another
important avenue through which routine creditor governance occurs. Not all
initial covenant settings may continue to be useful or suitable over the life of
a loan, and covenant violations focus the attention of lender and borrower on
firm's
formulating appropriate adjustments to changed circumstances. The
70
continuing deterioration often leads to more aggressive intervention.1
C.

Important Areas of Influence

This section discusses three crucial areas of private lender influencefinancial policy, investment policy, and CEO turnover-where lender influence rivals or may surpass that of boards, shareholders, and even managers
themselves. For financial and investment policy, lender influence commences
at the inception of the lending arrangement and increases if and when the
borrower firm falters. CEO turnover, of course, is a more drastic corporate
governance decision, where lender influence typically surfaces as the firm's
performance declines.
Lender influence in these key areas is widespread among public companies,
and evidence suggests that it may be efficient. Lender monitoring and influence
increase as the firm falters, and lender intervention may help curb managers'
riskraking at exactly the point when they may be tempted to make ill-advised
bets: when the firm is in trouble and managers want to make up for earlier losses.

170.
See DeAngelo et al., supra note 87, at 5 (describing the demise of L.A. Gear over a sixyear period, its bank's continual resetting of the company's covenants as it deteriorated, and the fact
that the company went through fourteen different credit agreements that gradually reduced its credit
line from $360 million to $25 million).
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Financial Policy

The presence of a private lender affects the borrower's financial policy
from the very beginning of the lending arrangement.'
As earlier noted,
almost all private lending agreements limit the borrower's ability to incur
' and performance pricing provisions often use a debt-toadditional debt, 72
cash flow ratio as the performance measure.'

Not surprisingly, a covenant violation often triggers further lender intervention in the firm's financial policy, typically resulting in a significant
permanent reduction in the company's borrowing activity. Measuring firms'
borrowing as a percentage of their assets, the average firm's net borrowing
decreases by 70 basis points-or 0.7 percent of its assets-in the quarter
immediately following a covenant violation,' 4 an effect that is economically
quite significant."' Looking at a broader time horizon, the average firm that
violates a financial covenant goes from borrowing 80 basis points per quarter
in the four quarters preceding the violation to decreasing its borrowing to -25
basis points two quarters after the violation, a swing of 105 basis points. 6 In
relative terms, this reduction in borrowing pushes the firm from the 75th percentile in borrowing to the 35th percentile. 77 This drastic change in financial policy is long lasting:
the decline in borrowing persists for over two years
8
after the violation.

The evidence also supports a causal role for creditor leverage in effecting
these significant changes in the borrower's financial policy. Initial covenant
violations trigger a much sharper drop in borrowing than subsequent viola171.
See supra Part II.B.1.
172.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
173.
See supra note 147.
174.
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 3, 19. The study measures net debt issuance, which
is basically new debt incurred minus debt retired for a given period.
175.
To put this effect in perspective, compare the effect of changes in firm size, which is the
single most powerful predictor of net borrowing. A two-standard-deviation reduction in the size of
the firm results in only a 52 basis point reduction in net borrowing per quarter. Id. at 3.
176.
Id. at 2. Negative borrowing simply means that the firm reduces the net amount of
existing debt rather than engaging in more borrowing.
Effects are also far more severe for firms that report creditor action in their SEC filings following
the covenant violation. These creditor actions include reduction in the size of the credit facility,
increase in interest spread, or a requirement of additional collateral. By the second quarter after the
violation, net decreases in borrowing average 418 basis points-or 4.18 percent of assets-for this set
of firms. Id. at 35, 63 tbl.IX. By contrast, for firms reporting a waiver with no specific creditor action,
the reduction in net borrowing after two quarters is only 29 basis points. Id. These results should be
treated with caution, however, as SEC disclosure rules do not necessarily require firms to detail all the
terms involved in a waiver, so creditor action may be systematically underreported. See id. at 8.
177.
Id.
at 2, 13.
178.
Id. This leads to an average decrease in leverage of more than 3 percent. Id.
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tions.'79

While borrowing declines by almost 150 basis points over the two
quarters following an initial violation,s' subsequent violations do not trigger
a statistically significant decrease in borrowing. 81 This is consistent with the
intuition that important creditor leverage comes by way of the acceleration
rights that accompany an initial violation. Once that leverage exists, and the
lender has intervened to influence the borrower's financial policy, subsequent
violations do not significantly increase creditor influence.'82
2.

Investment Policy

Investment policy is a crucial area of strategic decisionmaking for corporate managers. Allocating outlays for long-term growth effectively places the
firm's bets on the future. Banks often have enormous influence on these
managerial decisions.'83 The loan agreement effectively makes allocation of
control over investment policy contingent on the borrower firm's performance. A covenant violation or deterioration in credit quality causes control
to shift to the lender,"8 which the lender then uses to constrain investment.
This influence is both widespread and significant.
A third of credit agreements to public companies contain a capital
expenditure restriction,'8 5 and a recent study finds that 42 percent of public
firms faced a covenant restricting capital expenditures at some point during a
ten-year sample period. 86 Initial imposition of a capital expenditure covenant
179.
Id. at 4.
180.
Id. at 31. In the first quarter after the initial violation, net borrowing drops by 81 basis
points. The estimate for the second-quarter reduction isan additional 66 basis points. Id.
181.
See id. at 31. An initial violation isone that has not been preceded by an earlier violation
by the firm in the previous four quarters. Id.at 30.
182.
Robustness checks further support this causal role for covenant violations. Tests reveal,
for example, that leverage ratios and debt-to-EBITDA ratios do not explain observed decreases in net
borrowings following a covenant violation. Id.at 24-26, 60 tbl.VI.
183.
As earlier noted, lending agreements often contain explicit constraints on investment
policy in the form of capital expenditure covenants. See supra Part II.A.2.
184.
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 82, at 1-6.
185.
Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 16, at 10.
186.
Id. Given that approximately 80 percent of public firms have private credit agreements,
extrapolating from this sample would suggest that about a third of all public companies would face a
capital expenditure restriction at some point over a similar period. Smaller firms are more likely to
suffer such a restriction, although even for firms with assets in the $1BB to $2.5BB range-large
enough to make it into the Fortune 1000-about one quarter have a capital expenditure covenant.
See id., at tbl.2. Credit quality also matters. For firms with a credit rating, only 6 percent of
investment grade firms are subject to a capital expenditure restriction, while 44 percent of belowinvestment-grade firms are under such a constraint. On other hand, this restriction is not just for
dicey firms. Even among firms rated BB--the highest non-investment grade, with a historical default
rate of less than 1 percent over a one-year horizon-almost 40 percent have a capital expenditure
restriction. See id. The covenant is especially common for particular industries. In retail trade,
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has bite, appreciably reducing borrower firms' investment. Firms obtaining
new credit agreements with a capital expenditure restriction show a 15-20
percent greater decline in investment than firms obtaining new credit
agreements without such a restriction. 87 Moreover, post-restriction investment levels cluster tightly just below the contractual cap, strongly suggesting
that the initial constraint affects investment, and not the other way around."
Imposition of capital expenditure restrictions also turns out to be
extremely sensitive to firm performance, suggesting that lenders are quite vigilant about monitoring firm investment levels and constraining investment
in response to poor performance. A borrower that has violated a covenant,
has higher debt relative to cash flow, or has lower credit quality is more
likely to be subject to a capital expenditure covenant, 89 and capital investment
typically declines sharply after poor performance or a covenant violation.' 90
Relative to initial credit agreements, capital expenditure restrictions are 51
percent more likely following a renegotiation involving a covenant violation. 9'
Similarly, for a firm whose S&P credit rating drops from BBB to BB-slipping
from an investment grade rating to non-investment grade-this almost
doubles its likelihood of having a capital expenditure covenant imposed.' 92
Imposition of this restriction is also more sensitive to a covenant violation
than other important loan terms, such as the interest rate spread, collateralization of the loan, or dividend restrictions.' 9 Similarly, sensitivity with respect
to deterioration in credit quality is greater for capital expenditure restrictions
than for interest rate spreads and dividend restrictions.!
In addition to being among the most sensitive contract features with
respect to poor performance, capital expenditure restrictions may also be efficient.'9 Firms under such investment constraints show large and statistically
significant increases in firm value (as measured by market-to-book value) and
wholesale trade, and services, roughly 40 percent of credit agreements constrain capital expenditures.
See id. For manufacturers, the fraction is about one-third. See id.
Id. at 20-21. This result controls for observed changes in investment opportunities and
187.
firm performance. See id. at tbl.7.
Id. at 21, figs.2 & 3, tbl.8. The persistence of the clustering over time helps rule out an ex
188.
ante contracting explanation. See id. at 22.
Id. at 17.
189.
Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 4.
190.
Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 16, at 18.
191.
Such a firm suffers a 21 percentage-point increase in the incidence of being subjected to a
192.
capital expenditure covenant, which represents a 95 percent increase in likelihood, evaluated at the
sample mean. Id. at 15.
Id. at 3, 18, tbl.6.
193.
194.
Id. at 16-17, tbl.5. Credit quality is measured using Standard and Poor's credit ratings.
Id. at tbl.5.
See id. at 23-25.
195.
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operating performance (as measured by return on assets) in the year after
imposition of the restriction. 96' Consistent with able lender governance,
firms' patterns of investment reduction following a covenant violation seem
to track agency cost concerns. For example, firms with greater stockpiles of
cash experience greater declines, 97' consistent with the notion that banks'
post-violation measures may be especially sensitive to agency costs of free
cash flow.'98 At the same time, capital expenditure covenants are less likely
for firms with better investment opportunities. ' 99 This suggests that lenders
may be sensitive to borrower firms' growth prospects and careful about imposing investment constraints that might stymie growth. Of course, these firms
are also more likely to have alternative financing options, so competitive
pressure may deter banks from imposing investment constraints. In either
case, this outcome appears to be value enhancing. The widespread use of capital expenditure covenants suggests that banks may have wide influence in
curbing managers' overinvestment tendencies, to the benefit of all claimants.
3.

CEO Turnover

CEO turnover is typically not a routine event for a firm. Abundant
anecdotal evidence confirms the important role lenders may play in forcing out
CEOs of poorly performing companies. °' This lender influence may be especially important when standard corporate governance mechanisms are hobbled.
For example, a firm's board of directors may be dominated by insiders or outside

196.
197.
198.

Id. at 23-24, fig.4, tbl.9.
Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 4.
See Jensen, supra note 3, at 323. Similarly, firms borrowing from a single lender

experience significantly greater declines in investment compared to firms borrowing from a large
syndicate. Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 28-29. This variation is consistent with the accepted
wisdom that single lenders face greater moral hazard than large lending syndicates because
renegotiation is more difficult with syndicates. See Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal
Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1996). Facing more misbehaving

borrowers, single lenders may take more aggressive measures. Chava & Roberts, supranote 159, at 28-29.
Firms with no prior dealings with their existing lenders also show greater declines than firms
borrowing from their long-established lenders. Id. at 4. This is consistent with the theory that banks
facing greater information asymmetry respond more aggressively to covenant violations.
199.
See Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 16, at 15. Market-to-book ratio proxies for investment
opportunities. Id. at 39, tbl.3.
200.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1209-11 (describing the 2005 ouster of the

Krispy Kreme CEO); Ozelge, supra note 51, at 4-5 (same); see also Mitchell Pacelle, Waiving or
Drowning: Banks Face Loan Bind, WALL ST.J., Oct. 15, 2001, at C1 (describing the appointment of a new
chief restructuring officer for ANC Rental Corp., parent of Alamo and National rental car companies, at
the request of lenders who agreed to defer an enormous principal payment and suspend certain covenants).
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directors with close ties to the CEO.0' And formal shareholder challenges to
incumbent directors are quite rare, and even more rarely successful.0 2
One study confirms that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is much
more sensitive to firm performance for firms with private debt.2"3 The study
compares similar poorly performing firms, °4 with either no bank debt or an
average amount of bank debt. The presence of the bank debt increases the
likelihood of forced CEO turnover by anywhere from 25 percent to 46 percent, depending on the performance measure used."' If the underperforming
firm also violates a loan covenant, the result is a 75 percent to 102 percent
increase in the probability of forced turnover, compared to an underperforming firm with no bank debt.20 6
Banks' influence in this regard may rival that of independent boards of
directors, especially when a loan covenant has been violated. One study
gauges the influence of independent boards in replacing poorly performing
CEOs by comparing the probability of CEO resignation under insiderdominated boards.0 The study measures the difference in CEO resignation
rates for firms with poor performance versus strong performance under both
types of boards.208 This comparison is captured in Figures 1 and 2 below, with
201.
See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 431
(1988) (noting the much higher rate of CEO retirements following poor performance when the
company's board of directors had 60 percent or more independent directors). Exchange listing rules
now require that listed companies have a majority of independent directors on their boards. See
NYSE, supra note 57 § 303(A); NASDAQ OMX GRP., INC., supra note 60, §5605(b). This may not
prevent insider domination, however. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 26, at 852-55.
202.
See Bebchuk, Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 24, at 677 (noting that from
1996-2005, companies with market capitalization exceeding $200 million saw fewer than three election
contests per year on average, with less than one per year being successful).
203.
Ozelge, supra note 51, at 14; see also Stuart C. Gilson Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and
Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 369-71 (documenting high CEO and director turnover rates for
firms experiencing financial distress).
A poorly performing firm is one whose performance is one standard deviation below the
204.
average industry residual performance. Ozelge, supra note 51, at 10, 23.
Id. at 23, 50 tbl.6 panel G. This estimate accounts for the endogeneity of bank borrowing.
205.
Return on assets and stock performance are the two performance measures used. Id. at 14.
206.
Id. at 32. Moreover, when the sample of firms experiencing a forced CEO turnover is
split based on whether a covenant violation occurred, the worst one-third of firms in terms of
performance that have also violated a covenant are roughly 3 to 7 times more likely to have their
CEO forced out than poorly performing firms with no violation, with the likelihood increasing with
the amount of bank debt. Id. at 51 tbl.7 panel B.
207.
Weisbach, supra note 201, at 431. For purposes of the study, an independent or "outside"
board is defined as one for which 60 percent or more of the directors are not full-time employees of
the company. Id. at 431,436. While this is not identical with the current post-SOX definition of an
independent board, see supra note 57 and accompanying text, the concepts are quite similar.
Weisbach, supra note 201, at 431. Performance is measured by stock returns. Firms with
208.
strong performance are those in the top decile of stock returns in the sample, and weakly performing
firms are those in the bottom decile. Id. at 440.
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Figure 1 showing the probabilities of CEO resignation under both types of
boards and with both poor and strong performance, while Figure 2 shows the
differences in probabilities. With independent boards, the probability of CEO
turnover is 7 percent for firms with weak performance and 1.3 percent for
firms with strong performance, a difference of 5.7 percent, which is both
statistically and economically significant." The corresponding probabilities
for insider-dominated boards are 5.7 percent and 3.6 percent, for a difference
of 2.1 percent, which is not significant.21 ° This evidence suggests that independent boards punish poor performance, but insider-dominated boards do not.
Compare private lender governance, using the corresponding difference
in probabilities for firms with an average level of bank debt that have violated
a loan covenant. This comparison is also included in Figures 1 and 2. For
firms with weak performance, 6.7 percent of CEOs get replaced annually; for
firms with strong performance, the probability is 0.8 percent, "' for a difference in probabilities of 5.9 percent-which is greater than for independent
boards." 2 This comparison demonstrates that bank influence on CEO turnover for poorly performing firms indeed rivals that of independent boards.
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Ozelge, supra note 51, at 1-2.
212.
For firms with an average level of bank debt that have not violated a covenant, the
probabilities are 5.2 percent (bottom decile in performance) and 1.4 percent (top docile), respectively,
for a 3.8 percent difference. Id.
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Operational Consequences and Governance Implications

Note the operational consequences of the various incentives and constraints that accompany private debt. Even with the initial loan agreement
and in the absence of any covenant violation, managers' efforts to manage
cash flow or current ratio or net worth for purposes of covenant compliance
or performance pricing may affect fundamental operational decisions. For
instance, a debt-limiting covenant may preclude a firm from borrowing to
build a factory or open new stores. So when the lender and the firm's management disagree about the advisability of debt-financed expansion, the lender's
potential veto may give it significant influence over the ultimate size and
scope of expansion."' At the least, management would have to negotiate
with its bankers over the project. Or a capital expenditure covenant may
restrict any expansion, even an internally financed expansion. Similarly,
cash flow covenants have wider effects than simply assuring debt repayment;
they may affect the borrower's uses of cash generally. These limitations may
constrain the scale of the borrower's operations, and by acceding to them, the
firm's management effectively cedes to the lender some amount of discretion
over fundamental business decisions. Moreover, the lender's vote here may

213.
Of course, the borrower has the option of refinancing with a different lender, but this may
be costly, and the borrower may not be able to convince another lender to relax the borrowing
limitation either.
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count for far more than the vote of any individual director or even the entire
board, since the lender may enjoy an effective veto.
In contrast to the veto implicit in standard covenant constraints, performance pricing offers more nuanced incentives for managers to improve
performance. Earning a lower interest rate through good performance not
only lowers borrowing costs but also frees up cash, which increases managerial
flexibility. Conversely, poor performance increases borrowing costs and reduces
free cash, while also foreshadowing the possibility of future lender intervention.
A covenant breach triggers the lender's right to cut off further credit
and to accelerate the debt, which could jeopardize the firm's viability. Of
14
course, it is ordinarily not in the lender's interest to accelerate precipitously
Given competitive loan markets, it behooves each lender to nurture a reputation for reasonable dealings with borrowers.'
On the other hand, the power to
216
accelerate may give the lender tremendous leverage over firm managers.
The covenant violation essentially causes a change of control in favor of the
lender,217 giving the lender some latitude to effect changes in the borrower's
business.
Lender-induced constraints and changes in financial and investment
policy, firm management, and operational strategy illustrate the significant
influence that a private lender enjoys over a borrower's fundamental business
decisions. Ordinary shareholders enjoy nothing approaching this level of
intervention. Creditor control rivals even the influence of the board of directors. No board would presume to impose controls at the level of detail that
private lenders typically prescribe-setting debt levels or capital expenditure
ceilings to constrain the firm's executive officers, for example. As noted
earlier,"8 in contrast to private lenders, directors suffer significant expertise
and informational deficits compared to the officers they purport to monitor, and
directors' monitoring incentives are relatively weak. Board monitoring
and governance seems feeble compared to lender governance.

214.
For example, a lender with more profitable lending opportunities might wish to call a loan
on a technicality in order to enable it to relend at higher spreads.
215.
"From the lenders' standpoint, it pays not to 'pull the trigger' and call the loan too early.
There is competition among banks for good loans, and imposing costs on borrowers when circumstances do not warrant this results in a loss of business." Dichev & Skinner, supra note 80, at 1096-97.
216.
Chava & Roberts, supra note 159, at 1.
217.
Id.
218.
See supra Part I.C.
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THE LIMITS OF LENDER GOVERNANCE:
CREDIT MARKET EFFECTS

To this point, we have focused on broadening the conventional thinking
on the influence of private lenders on firm governance. In this Part, I discuss
potential limitations on lender influence from credit market effects: liquidity
and opportunities for risk transfer. Liquidity simply refers to the competitiveness of lending markets. Stronger competition among lenders reduces
each lender's enforcement leverage"--to set covenants, monitor borrowers,
and influence firm governance. Risk transfer opportunities-through syndication, secondary loan markets, and markets for credit derivatives-offer private
lenders the ability to reduce or even eliminate exposure to particular credit
risks, which may reduce their monitoring incentives and thereby impair
lender governance."'
A.

Market Liquidity

Competition among lenders affects each lender's leverage over its
borrowers. When money is cheap, competition intensifies, sometimes causing
riskier lending overall with fewer constraints on managerial discretion.
The advent of "covenant-lite" loans-loans with few or no covenant
constraints-that preceded the recent credit crisis offers one salient example.
From 2003-2007, a liquidity explosion in international credit markets led to
cheap money and fierce competition among lenders to finance leveraged
buyouts (LBOs)."' This competition led to lax underwriting standards
and weaker monitoring incentives, as evidenced by increasingly higher
leverage of funded deals over the period and weaker covenants. For
borrowers-the LBO target firms--covenant-lite loans reduced the likelihood
See supra Part I.C.2.
219.
220.
The one existing study on this issue finds no evidence consistent with reduced bank
monitoring when the borrower firm's loans trade. See Gande & Saunders, supra note 123.
Loan purchasers may also not have the same reputational stakes that banks have in maintaining
good working relationships with their borrowers. A loan purchaser may therefore be less willing to
forbear from taking precipitous action in the face of a technical covenant violation. If the loan is
securitized, exercising any governance rights at all may be tricky. With a securitization, the new
owner of the pooled bank loans (or participations) issues securities backed by the cash flows from the
loans. This new issuing entity is managed by a trustee, who has little incentive to become actively
involved in any one loan. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview,
M&A LAWYER, Apr. 2008, at 8.
See Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks & Henri Servaes, Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, J.
221.
APPL. CORP. FIN., Fall 2007, at 44-46 (discussing worldwide liquidity explosion and its effects on
LBO financing); Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L.REv. 1975, 2014-16 (2007) (same).
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of technical default and preserved their operational flexibility, but these loans
left banks with fewer tools to constrain managers and dampened monitoring
incentives.222
Though seldom discussed, traditional mechanisms of corporate governance may suffer similar capital market effects. For example, even underperforming CEOs are less likely to be replaced when general industry or market
performance is strong. 3 After all, nothing succeeds like success, so shareholders
and directors are unlikely to challenge management during good times.
Strong firm performance might reflect good management and good governance, or it may simply reflect the natural ebb and flow of industry-wide
success or frothy equity markets. Boards apparently are not entirely successful
at filtering out industry and market effects when evaluating CEO performance.2 So while the efficacy of lender governance may be affected by debt
market conditions, traditional shareholder-centered governance arrangements
are not immune to similar capital market effects.
B.

Risk Transfer

Private lenders have increasingly more and finer opportunities to transfer risk to third parties, which may blunt lenders' incentives to monitor.
Common risk transfer mechanisms include loan syndication, secondary loan
markets, and markets for credit derivatives. Large loans are typically syndicated. A group of lenders shares a loan's exposure in specified percentages,
reducing the risk for any given lender. A liquid secondary loan market
enables a lender to sell its stake in an existing loan.22 Finally, the ready availability of credit derivatives enables a lender to insure against default by
specific borrowers. 6

222.
The higher debt levels and weaker monitoring likely increased systemic risk overall. See
Acharya, Franks & Servaes, supra note 221, at 46.
223.
See Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation 4-5
(Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1992, 2008), available at
SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=885531.
224.
See id. at 2.
225.
See Steven A. Dennis & Donald J.Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J.FIN. INTERMEDIATION
404, 404 (2000) (describing the growing prevalence of syndicated loans); Gary B.Gorton & George G.
Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 391
(1995) (describing the dramatic rise in loan sales that occurred in the 1980s).
226.
The most popular credit derivative for bank lenders is the credit default swap. As with
conventional insurance, the insured (here, the lender) pays a premium to the issuer of the swap
agreement, which obligates the issuer to repay the insured debt (or some portion) to the insured
should the borrower default. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Peril of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1019, 1021-22 (2007).
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Though each of these devices might theoretically blunt private lenders'
monitoring incentives by enabling them to reduce risk exposure to a particular
loan, offsetting considerations in loan syndication and secondary loan trading
tend to bond lenders as faithful monitors. Derivatives, however, pose a more
thorny problem for lender governance, and for corporate governance generally.
1.

Loan Syndication and Secondary Market Transactions

The typical bank loan to a public company is syndicated. A large
money center bank-the "lead" bank-negotiates the loan with the borrower
while it assembles the lending syndicate.227 The lead bank takes the laboring
oar in performing due diligence on the borrower, and prospective syndicate
members typically rely on the lead bank's documentation in performing their
credit analyses."2 Once the syndicate is assembled and the loan is in place,
9
the lead bank-which typically holds the largest stake in the loan2 '-is
granted wide powers to act as agent for the syndicate, for which the lead bank
is paid a fee.23 It takes the lead in administering the loan, monitoring the
borrower and communicating with firm management on behalf of the syndicate, and disseminating information within the syndicate.' When a borrower
violates a covenant or defaults, the lead bank plays a central role in investigating and recommending a course of action to the syndicate.232

227.

See Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence From Syndicated

Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007); Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Private Information,
Agency Problems and Determinants of Loan Syndications: Evidence From 1987-1999, at 4 (Apr. 25,
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=310003. The
arranging bank may underwrite the loan as well, in effect committing to extend the specified loan
even before the formation of the syndicate is complete.
228.
See Barry Bobrow, Mercedes Tech & Linda Redding, An Introduction to the Primary Market,
in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 155, 179 (Allison Taylor & Alicia
Sansone eds., 2007); Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 227, at 5; Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks
Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV. 45, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 47.
229.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1244; Sufi, supra note 227, at 633.
230.
The credit agreement spells out these relations among syndicate members. See Richard
Wight, Warren Cooke & Richard Gray, Understanding the Credit Agreement, in THE HANDBOOK OF
LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING, supra note 228, at 209, 354. As competition among banks
intensified and league tables became a popular device for "keeping score" among banks and ranking
them, lead arrangers began carving out new distinguishing roles and accompanying titles to induce participation in their syndicates. New-and largely ceremonial-titles include "administrative agent,"
"syndication agent," "documentation agent," and "managing agent," which may also indicate some
sharing of functions that had traditionally been performed by the sole lead bank. See Steve Miller, Players
in the Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING, supranote 228, at 47, 50.
231.
Sufi, suprra note 227, at 632-33.
232.
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 15, at 23-24.
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As the arranger for the loan and its primary monitor and administrator,
the lead bank typically enjoys informational advantages over other syndicate
members. One might therefore worry that the lead bank could behave opportunistically toward syndicate members-for example by syndicating poor
quality loans or shirking on its monitoring duties. As the agent for the syndicate, the lead bank reaps only a pro rata benefit from diligent monitoringsharing with the entire lender group-while it enjoys all the benefits from
shirking. " Lead banks and other private lenders may also sell their loans in
liquid secondary loan markets. This ready exit option may create moral hazard, encouraging lax credit analysis in the origination process or weaker
monitoring after the loan is made.234
Existing studies strongly suggest, however, that lead banks have reputational stakes in their treatment of syndicate members. Far from behaving
opportunistically, lead banks in fact syndicate loans of higher ex ante quality
in larger proportions," and they retain larger proportions of riskier loans.236
Lead banks also syndicate a larger proportion of loans to borrowers whose
creditworthiness holds up over time, as measured by ex post credit ratings.237
More generally, lead banks' reputations as faithful agents improve their ability

233.
For example, the lead bank might decide to devote more resources to originating new
loans rather than monitoring existing syndicated loans, as to which risk is shared.
234.
See Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 225 (discussing moral hazard in the secondary loan
market). Given originating lenders' likely informational advantages over secondary market purchasers,
it might not be surprising if lower quality loans were more likely to trade than those of higher quality.
Especially given the emerging "originate-to-distribute" model of syndication-in which the lead
arranger anticipates selling large portions of a given loan to institutional investors in secondary markets
shortly after origination-arrangers may be less concerned about careful credit analysis or subsequent
monitoring than if they expected to hold the loans for longer periods. See Antje Bemdt & Anurag
Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit
(Oct. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1290312; Greg Nini, How Non-Banks Increased the Supply of Bank Loans: Evidence From
Institutional Term Loans (Mar. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1108818 (documenting the boom in syndicating leverage loan tranches to
nonbank institutional investors).
235.
See Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 225, at 424 (testing for ex ante quality); see also
Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Loan Syndicate Structure: Evidence From Ex Post
Risk 3-4 (Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1083707 (finding that lead banks syndicate greater proportions of loans to ex post higher
quality borrowers as measured by bond ratings).
236.
See Simons, supra note 228, at 49 tbl.3 (showing that the proportion of a syndicated loan
retained by the lead bank increases with the severity of the borrower's credit problems, as subsequently
determined by bank examiners' loan quality classifications); Sufi, supra note 227, at 633. For more
opaque borrowers, that require greater due diligence and monitoring, the lead bank generally retains
a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate, with lenders that are "closer" to the
borrower both geographically and in terms of prior lending relationships. Id.
237.
Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 235, at 24.
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to arrange syndications.23s These findings suggest that lead banks value their
reputations, which should induce them to monitor conscientiously despite
the risk diversification from syndication.
As far as loan sales, the lead bank typically does not sell its stake,239
preferring instead to preserve its relationships with both the borrower and its
syndicate members, who not only depend on the lead bank for monitoring
services,24 but likely agreed to join the syndicate relying at least in part on
the lead bank's continuing involvement in the loan. Lead banks also often
constrain resale by syndicate members, imposing requirements that may include
lead bank and even borrower consent.24 ' Lead banks and borrowers may be
concerned about syndicate size and composition, since, all other things being
equal, a larger syndicate makes collective decisionmaking more difficult.242
Holdout problems increase with syndicate size, 4 which may be especially
troubling when the borrower's distress requires a modification of the loan."4
Lenders in general also appear to anticipate potential secondary market
purchasers' concerns about moral hazard with respect to monitoring, as well
as adverse selection.245 Selling lenders do not always sell their entire stake in
a loan, often retaining a portion in order to assure purchasers of both the
quality of the loan and the seller's continuing stake in monitoring the borrower. Consistent with this implicit assurance, loan sellers typically retain

238.
See Dennis & Mullineaux, sup'ra note 225, at 407 (finding that lead banks' success in
syndicating larger percentages of their loans is positively associated with reputational measures).
239.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1244.
240.
See Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 235, at 3 (describing the lead bank's role as the
delegated monitor for the syndicate); Sufi, supra note 227, at 632 (noting the lead arranger's role as the
syndicate's primary monitor). For their part, borrowers generally expect and prefer a durable relationship
with their lead bank, which has specialized knowledge of its borrowers' business and financial condition.
If the lead bank exits by selling its loan, the borrower may be left with a different agent bank that it has
never worked with and that may not be to its liking.
241.
Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of
Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 111 (2004). Forty-four percent of the
transactions in their sample of syndicates loans from 1987-1995 included a requirement for lead
bank consent for loan resale. Id. at 117.
242.
Modification of a syndicated loan requires a vote among the members. For major changes---in
principal, interest, maturity, or collateral--unanimity istypically required. For technical violations or
covenant waivers, a simple majority or supermajority will typically suffice. See Sufi, supra note 227, at 633.
243.

OLIVER HART, FIRMs, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).

244.
See Lee & Mullineaux, supra note 241, at 111. The effect of loan sale restrictions may be
ambiguous in terms of reducing holdout problems, however. Originating syndicates tend to be larger
and loan concentrations lower for loans with resale constraints. These liquidity constraints make the
loan less attractive to participants, who take smaller shares as a result. Id. at 120-21.
245.
That is,potential purchasers may fear that sellers only want to dump their bad loans.
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larger portions of riskier loans.246 Loans that are ultimately sold also contain
more restrictive covenants than loans that are not sold.247 These tighter
covenants, by putting borrowers on a tighter leash, help address both presale
moral hazard and adverse selection.248 Tighter covenants set quick triggers for
intervention, so that even a lender expecting to sell its loan would be
prompted to investigate earlier and more often than with loose covenants, if
for no other reason than to approve a waiver of any violation. Moreover,
waivers too readily extended might elicit later inquiries from a prospective
loan purchaser. Tighter covenants also help mitigate the loan purchaser's
informational disadvantage by offering the same quick trigger for intervention
that the seller enjoyed. 9
Overall, the evidence suggests that while syndication and secondary
loan trading might theoretically dampen banks' monitoring incentives, lead
banks and selling banks anticipate and address this concern for the benefit of
syndicate members and loan purchasers, respectively. Lead banks have reputational stakes in refraining from opportunism in a syndication, and both lead
banks and selling banks take steps to bond themselves as monitors.2"'

246.
Gorton & Pennachi, supra note 225, at 408 & tbl.5; cf. Berndt & Gupta, supra note 234
(finding evidence of bank moral hazard insofar as firms whose loans are sold have worse risk adjusted
stock returns over the three years following the loan sale compared to firms whose loans are not sold).
247.
Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships
2 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research Working Paper No. WP 2007-04, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com
abstract=920877.
248.
Moreover, tighter covenants help increase borrowers' debt capacity by making their loans
more saleable in secondary markets. Id.
249.
More generally, bank monitoring continues to have value in the presence of bank debt
trading. Amar Gande and Anthony Saunders find that bank loan announcements are associated
with positive stock price reactions, even when the borrower's loans already trade on the secondary
market. See Gande & Saunders, supra note 123, at 3. This result holds even for distressed firms, for
which reduced incentives for bank monitoring would ex ante be expected to have the most adverse
effects. Id. Additionally, the inception of trading in the borrower's bank debt also elicits a positive
stock price reaction, suggesting that bank monitoring and the secondary market offer complementary
sources of information about borrower firms. Id.at 22.
250.
Charles Whitehead has offered a reason to embrace loan markets as a facilitator of lender
governance. More complete credit markets may improve governance through transparent pricing of
credit risk. In the same way that stock prices inform equity holders about the firm's condition and
prospects, liquid credit markets may offer price signals to creditors about a firm's creditworthiness,
enabling those creditors to adjust their relations with the firm. Creditors might come to rely on these
credit market price signals as a supplement to or substitute for traditional covenants and monitoring.
Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, die Credit Market, md Corporate Governance,
34 J. CORP L.641,660 (2009).
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2.

Credit Derivatives

Liquid markets in credit derivatives may have more pernicious consequences for bank governance than syndication or secondary loan markets.
Derivatives markets enable investors to construct portfolios that disaggregate
cash flow rights from the control rights associated with their investments.
Governance rights and economic rights no longer need go together."' Among
other worries for corporate governance scholars, this slicing and dicing
enables equity holders to vote shares with no underlying economic interest
in the issuing company. More perversely, it facilitates voting against value.
An investor may take a short position in the issuer's equity and then profit by
voting for a value-destroying course of action.252 This is the problem of "decoup'
ling" or "empty voting."253
Similar problems plague credit markets. For lenders, credit derivatives
offer infinite opportunities to diversify risk while still nominally holding debt.
For example, a private lender can easily purchase a credit default swap (CDS)
that fully insures against the risk of a specific borrower's nonpayment."' A
CDS, the most common and most widely traded credit derivative, is a two-party
contract pursuant to which a protection seller (an investment bank, for
example) agrees to insure a protection buyer (a lender, for example) against
default for a specified loan. 5 For a fee, the protection seller in effect guarantees the original lender against the specified default risk, enabling the lender

251.
See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance
and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663 (2008), available at http://ssm.con/abstract=
1084075.
252.
A short position in a security-in which an investor profits from a decline in the
security's price--can be accomplished in any number of ways. For example, a short seller may borrow
securities from a broker to sell in the market, hoping the market value of the securities later drops.
This would enable the short seller to repurchase the securities at a lower price, repaying the securities
to the broker while reaping a profit.
253.
See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 625 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Decoupling II];

Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007); Henry T.

C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ounership, 79
S. CAL. L. REv. 811 (2006).
254.
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 33 (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. Law,
Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. 08-9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396827. Other
hedging-decoupling strategies may include other types of credit derivatives or even equity hedges.
See Hu & Black, DecouplingII, supra note 253, at 728-29.
255.
A "credit event" that triggers payment to the lender-protection buyer includes a payment
default or bankruptcy filing.
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to fully hedge against the risk of a given loan. 2"6 As a result of this debt
decoupling, the lender eliminates its economic stake in the borrower's fortunes, while retaining its original governance rights with respect to the loan.
Not only does this minimize the lender's incentive to monitor, 27 but it
may also induce the lender to refuse to renegotiate even technical covenant
violations."5 Default and acceleration guaranty the lender's full payment on
the debt under the terms of the CDS. More perversely, the nominal creditor
could be overhedged-overinsured on its loan. For example, a lender with
a $100 million exposure on a loan may have purchased protection for a
notional amount of $200 million. In that case, the lender holds a net negative position in the debt, which means it would profit from the borrower's
default.259 That creditor would be worse than indifferent to a workout; it
sabotaging any workout effort and
would gain the most by affirmatively
26 °
causing the borrower to fail.

Private lenders may also sometimes vote their debt, and as with a short
equity position 6 an overhedged lender might be induced to vote against value.
A private lender typically votes in two contexts-as a syndicate member
regarding modification of a syndicated loan and as a creditor in bankruptcy.
For a syndicated loan, modification of major contract terms-principal amount
or interest spread-typically requires unanimity among syndicate members.262
In bankruptcy, creditors are entitled to vote on any plan of reorganization. In
both cases, a lender with a net negative position may exercise its vote to frustrate
rehabilitative efforts in order to tank the business and maximize its payout
under its swap contracts.2"
In theory, then, credit default swaps might not only weaken private
lenders' monitoring incentives, but might also encourage them to pursue valuedestroying strategies to maximize their private profits. The reputational
T

256.
Credit default swaps are also commonly written on debt securities as well, insuring debt
holders against the issuer's default risk. See infra Part V.C.
257.
Hu & Black, supra note 220, at 8.
258.
Id.
See Hu & Black, Decoupling II, supra note 253, at 731; see also Baird & Rasmussen, supra
259.
note 254, at 18 (discussing the possibility of perverse voting incentives in bankruptcy for holders of
securities in two or more classes of claims or interests).
See Hu & Black, supra note 220, at 6-7 (discussing rumors of hedge funds' short debt
260.
positions in the 2005 bankruptcy of Tower Automotive).
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
261.
Sufi, supranote 227, at 633.
262.

263.

Creditors are placed into classes for voting purposes based on the nature of their claims.

Each class is ordinarily required to approve the plan in order for it to be confirmed, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (2006), and approval of a creditor class requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds in dollar
amount and a simple majority in number of claims in the class. Id.§ 1126(a).
264.
See Hu & Black, Decoupling I, supranote 253, at 732 (discussing empty voting by creditors).
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constraints discussed above in the loan trading context might constrain private
lenders from pursuing hedging strategies that put them at odds with their
borrowers or other syndicate members, but it is hard to be sure that value
destruction does not occur. To date, empirical investigation of this phenomenon has been stymied by a lack of transparency in CDS markets. Swaps
typically trade over the counter, without the benefit of a public exchange or
comprehensive disclosure requirements. 65 While pricing information is publicly available based on the reference entity-that is, the borrower of the
underlying debt 266 -transaction-specific information about buyers and sellers is
relatively scant. At the least, vibrant but opaque CDS markets may limit the
promise of private lender governance. As discussed above,26 shareholdercentered governance suffers a similar threat from equity-based derivatives.
Regulatory reforms relating to derivatives are in the offing in the wake
of the current credit crisis.268 In Part V, I discuss current proposals and their
likely beneficial effect on lender governance.
C.

Assessing the Limits

Market liquidity and risk transfer opportunities affect the efficacy of
lender governance by affecting lenders' influence over managers and lenders'
monitoring incentives. Similar liquidity and risk transfer issues may affect
traditional shareholder-centered governance mechanisms as well. Ultimately,
it perhaps should not be surprising that capital market activities affect investors'
incentives and ability to discipline corporate managers.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF LENDER GOVERNANCE

Having explained the operation and limits of lender governance, and
made the case for its significance, I now explore its important and wideranging implications and the new questions it raises. Doctrinal, regulatory,
and research issues may all require reexamination in order to account for
lender influence. On doctrine, lender governance sits at the intersection of
corporate law and debtor-creditor law, and its newfound significance may
implicate legal applications in both these areas. As for financial regulation,
265.
Trading occurs privately, facilitated by securities dealers' proprietary networks.
266.
See generally Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Tradingin Credit Derivatives,
84 J.FIN. ECON. 110, 115-17 (2007) (discussing data availability with CDS trading).
267.
See supra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
268.
Sarah N. Lynch & Serena Ng, U.S. Moves to Regulate Derivatives Trade, WALL ST. J., May 14,
2009, at Cl (describing the Obama administration's recent proposal for new regulation of derivatives).
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current reform proposals are understandably concerned primarily with systemic risk, and not with corporate governance. Reform should, however, be
sensitive to potential spillovers that might affect lenders' monitoring incentives and governance role. After all, much of the proposed reform intends to
alter significantly the operations of both creditors and credit markets, especially proposals aimed at the origination and trading of credit default swaps.
Finally, corporate governance research must incorporate lender governance
in order to offer a complete account of how corporate governance works.
A.

Fiduciary Duties for Private Lenders?

Since private lenders wield influence over managerial decisionmaking
comparable to that of directors, perhaps private lenders should be charged
with similar duties to the corporation and its shareholder body. Certainly for
shareholders, control is generally viewed as a touchstone for imposition of
fiduciary duties.269 Iman Anabtawi and Lynn Stout have recently proposed an
expansion of this approach to include noncontrolling "activist" shareholders
seeking to influence management decisionmaking as to certain specific
transactions."' Control-based theories applicable for shareholder fiduciary
duties, however, seem an ill fit for private lenders. Because of both the conceptual difficulties and practical consequences, no generalized fiduciary duties
should apply to private lenders.
The standard contractarian account of corporate fiduciary duties does
not lend itself well to a justification for lender fiduciary duties. Corporate
fiduciary duties are generally meant to fill the gaps in the inevitably
incomplete contract between shareholders and managers.' The inevitable
incompleteness stems from the breadth of discretion managers must enjoy
in order to manage a complex business organization. Given the complexity and
unpredictability of the future decisions managers must make, it would be
difficult to specify all the terms of the shareholder-manager contract ex ante.
Instead, fiduciary duties offer a hypothetical contract that operates as a set
of general standards for managerial conduct. A controlling shareholder inher-

269.
See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 25, at 1269 (noting that "the degree to which a shareholder
controls the board has become the judicial touchstone of shareholder fiduciary duty").
270.
See id. at 1295 (arguing that a shareholder's ability to influence the outcome of a
particular corporate decision in which it has a personal conflict should trigger a duty of loyalty).
271.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 92.
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its these duties because its control position enables it to replace-and therefore
control-the firm's management.272
In contrast to this hypothetical shareholder-manager contract, private
lenders enjoy actual, explicit contracts with the borrower company. This
explicit contract spells out the borrower's obligations and the lender's remedies, all of which are designed to facilitate the lender's individual recovery,
independent of any effects on shareholders or other creditors. Moreover, it is
well understood that the standard creditor remedy of seizing borrower assets
to satisfy unpaid debts may cause the borrower's demise and the destruction of
shareholder value. The lender no doubt has influence over managers' decisionmaking and may in distress situations-which I discuss below-have
sufficient influence to demand the replacement of senior management or
other significant changes. Unlike an officer or a controlling shareholder,
however, the lender's influence derives from its external contract with the
firm, and not from an organic role in the firm's internal management. The
lender does not enjoy the general wide-ranging discretion over the firm's
affairs that managers exercise, but only the specific rights described in its contract with the firm. The firm responds to lender influence-agreeing to
covenant constraints or financial disclosure, for example-in order to receive
favorable treatment under the contract. Similar negotiating dynamics occur
with respect to the firm's other contracts as well, for example its property
leases and labor agreements. By contrast, managers' and controlling shareholders' influence derives from their grip on the firm's internal corporate
governance levers. It is this wide-ranging open-ended control and discretion
over the firm's affairs that demands fiduciary duty constraints, both as to
controlling shareholders and managers.
Similarly, the case for fiduciary duties for activist shareholders rests on
specific shareholder-related premises. Shareholders are generally meant to share
equally in the corporate spoils. A controlling shareholder's attempt to garner
gains for itself to the exclusion of other shareholders triggers duty of loyalty
constraints.273 Anabtawi and Stout argue for an extension of this basic rule to
include the activist shareholder that uses its influence to promote a specific
transaction or management decision that enables it to capture a personal

272.
It may replace the board for a good reason or no reason at all. The articles of incorporation
may specify, however, that outside the annual election context, directors may be removed only for
cause. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.08 (2005). No similar constraint operates with respect to annual
director elections. The controlling shareholder is not required to justify its vote, and may elect
whomever it wishes.

273.

See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
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economic benefit not captured by shareholders generally. 274 Even crediting
Anabtawi and Stout's analysis as applied to shareholders, the framework
seems inapt for private lenders. A private lender has no implicit agreement to
share recoveries with any other party, and shareholders have no such expectation of sharing with creditors. Moreover, line drawing problems abound once
we move away from shareholders. Because many of the firm's contracts will
contain important limits on managers' discretion intended for the specific
benefit of the counterparty to the contract,275 imposing a generalized fiduciary duty in these cases seems fraught with peril. It seems an intractable task
to structure a general duty that would both allow private lenders to exercise
their explicit contract rights-negotiating a tighter covenant in exchange for
waiver of a covenant violation, for example-and at the same time constrain
them from generally acting in their own interest in favor of shareholders or
the corporation as a whole. Incorporating such an ambiguous generalized
fiduciary duty would inject perhaps debilitating uncertainty into creditors'
collection efforts, which would translate directly into higher borrowing costs
for companies.
Distress situations admittedly may deserve special attention. Private
lenders' influence is greatest in that context, as are the conflicts among private lenders and other investors. In fact, courts have, through a variety of
lender liability doctrines, constrained banks' decisionmaking regarding
troubled borrowers. Courts have imposed good faith requirements upon
lenders.276 Court have also held that domination and control of the distressed
borrower's day-to-day operations may cause the lender to be deemed an insider
or fiduciary,277 such that fraudulent or inequitable conduct would subject the
274.
For example, when a hedge fund, holding shares in a proposed merger target, acquires
voting rights in shares of the prospective acquirer and hedges away any economic interest in those
shares, and then votes in favor of the merger in order to benefit the fund's investment in the target
shares, that triggers loyalty duties for the hedge fund as a shareholder of the acquirer. Anabtawi &
Stout, supra note 25, at 1287.
275.
For example, a lease agreement may contain a prohibition on change of control. A
merger by the firm might trigger a default. Lou R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS 2-51 (2005).
276.
See K.M.C. Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (imposing a good
faith requirement with respect to a bank lender's discretionary refusal to advance funds or demand
repayment); see also Shepherd, Tung & Yoon, supra note 12, at 1039-40 (discussing lender liability and
deepening insolvency).
277.
See In re Exide Techs., Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 743-46 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (upholding
allegations in the complaint that the lenders' control over the borrowers rendered them insiders,
whose claims may be subject to equitable subordination). According to the Exide complaint, the
secured lenders caused the borrower to (a) grant the lenders significant pledges of prepetition
collateral as part of an acquisition; (b) delay its bankruptcy filing to minimize the risk of preference
avoidance to the lenders; and (c) fraudulently continue operating long after it should have been
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lender to damages for harm caused to the company.27s The lender's own claim
might also be subordinated below the claims of competing creditors harmed by
such conduct.279 In addition to the threat of legal liability, as earlier noted,
lenders have important reputational stakes in working with borrowers and
avoiding precipitous collection action.2 8° These various constraints operate to

temper aggressive lenders in distress situations, with courts willing to punish
fraudulent or inequitable conduct without broadly requiring lenders to share
with other investors. Generalized fiduciary duties are unnecessary and would
be counterproductive.
B. Optimal Debtor-Creditor Law
As the preceding discussion of lender liability demonstrates, regulating
debtor-creditor relations optimally is tricky business, and courts and bankruptcy
systems play an important regulatory role here. Courts periodically perceive
imbalance in the equities between borrowers and lenders, and they attempt
to rectify it by policing creditor collection efforts with the equitable doclaw have
trines discussed earlier."' The traditional goals I,of debtor-creditor
1
282
always been to promote fairness or efficient credit markets, but tinkering with
liquidated. The court refused to dismiss claims for deepening insolvency and equitable subordination. See
id. at 743-46. The court also upheld insider preference claims. See id.; see also In re Adelphia
Commc'ns Corp., 365 B.R. 24, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that the lender's control of the
borrower's day-to-day management and operations or "the ability to compel the borrower to engage
in unusual transactions" may trigger a fiduciary duty to the borrower); Temp-Way Corp. v. Cont'l
Bank, 1369 B.R. 299, 317-18 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (same).
278.
See Exide Technologies, Inc., 299 B.R. at 751-52 (finding that controlling the borrower in
order to force it to fraudulently continue its business while suffering massive losses to the detriment of
competing creditors-deepening its insolvency-was actionable); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. R. F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.2d 340,349 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding an independent cause of
action against firm managers and third parties for improperly expanding corporate debt and prolonging the
life of an insolvent company). Some observers argue that courts appear to be abandoning the cause of
action for deepening insolvency. Hugh M. McDonald, Todd S. Fishman & Laura Martin, Lafferty's
Orphan: The Abandonment of DeepeningInsolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 26, 2008, at 1.
See In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that a lender that
279.
uses its leverage over the borrower to control the borrower's management to its own advantage and
the detriment of other creditors may be subject to subordination); Exide Technologies, Inc., 299 B.R.
at 744 (requiring inequitable conduct to justify equitable subordination); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 510.5 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th rev. ed. 2008) (explaining that equitable subordination may be
available against a lender when it has engaged in inequitable conduct resulting in injury to other creditors
or an unfair advantage to the lender).
See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
280.
See supra notes 276-279 and accompanying text.
281.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
282.
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (arguing that full priority for secured credit in
bankruptcy is inefficient); Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV.
1199 (proposing an efficient business bankruptcy scheme, whose singular goal is to minimize capital

174

57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 115 (2009)

debtor-creditor relations also has important effects on the degree of lender
influence over firm management-that is, lender governance.
Lender governance may be value enhancing or not depending on the
circumstances. Overly aggressive creditor action such as premature liquidation may be wasteful, destroying value.283 The threat of aggressive creditor
action may even suboptimally dampen managerial risktaking." One important study finds that where creditor rights are too strong, managers may feel
very keenly the personal cost of unsuccessful firm projects, and they may react
with excessive conservatism."' Lender liability doctrines may help curb some
forms of lender opportunism. Even the possibility of such suits affects the
bargaining between borrowers and lenders, causing lenders perhaps to be gunshy in their enforcement strategies. But overdeterrence of lenders may be
problematic as well. Private lenders' role in constraining overinvestment or
286 not
replacing a poorly performing CEO are likely to be value enhancing,"
just for lenders but for all investors."' To the extent the shadow of liability
overdeters private lenders from exercising their contractual leverage, it may
harm investors generally by hampering lender governance." Given these
important governance spillovers from debtor-creditor laws, their design should

costs for firms); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436
(1997) (discussing the debate over the efficiency and distributional fairness of secured lending).
283.
On the other hand, a deal that looks inefficient ex post may be one that is efficient ex
ante. A conditional threat of value destruction may be necessary to incentivize managers to avoid
the condition in the first place. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 6, at 1314.
284.
See Viral V. Acharya, Yakov Amihud & Lubomir Litov, Creditor Rights and Corporate
Risk-Taking (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1 103102 (finding that across countries, stronger creditor rights leads to diversifying, riskreducing acquisitions and lower operating risk, which may be suboptimal).
285.
Id.
286.
See supra Part III.C.
287.
Manager-shareholder opportunism is also a risk. Independent of any contractual constraints,
courts have long implied a fiduciary duty to creditors upon a firm's insolvency, attempting to curb
managers' overinvestment tendencies upon financial distress. See Frederick Tung, The New Death of
Contract: CreepingCorporate FiduciaryDuties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 820 (2008). The scope
of this court supervision has waxed and waned over time. Compare Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 & n.55 (Del. Ch.
1991) (finding that when a firm is in the "vicinity of insolvency," firm managers must include
creditors in the "community of interests" to whom managerial duties run), with N. Am. Catholic
Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (explicitly rejecting Credit
Lyonnais' vicinity-of-insolvency duties).
288.
A similar issue arises with respect to environmental cleanup liability under CERCLA-the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2006). A lender who exercises control over the borrower's facility runs the risk of being subjected to
cleanup liability, as either an "operator," see U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), or an entity
deemed to "participate in management." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (E), (F).
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incorporate lender governance considerations, in addition to the traditional
fairness and credit market efficiency concerns.289
C.

Financial Regulatory Reform and Lender Governance

The current financial turmoil in the United States and around the world
has spurred policymakers to rethink the fundamental structure of financial
regulation. The failure or nationalization of major financial institutions has
incited calls for reform to assure institutions' safety and soundness. While these
issues relate only indirectly to the efficacy of private lender influence in corporate governance, the latter will certainly be affected. Given the significance
of lender influence on managerial decisionmaking, consideration of regulatory reform should include analysis of its effects on lenders' corporate
governance-related behavior and incentives. I consider one important target
for reform, the credit default swap (CDS) market.
CDS transactions and trading have been an integral component of the
current financial crisis.29 Therefore, it is no surprise that calls for regulatory
reform include proposals for CDS regulation. Several too-big-to-fail financial
institutions took precarious positions in credit default swaps, which led to
their demise. For example, by the time the Federal Reserve seized American
International Group (AIG) on September 16, 2008, AIG had written billions
of dollars worth of unhedged protection on mortgage-backed securities.' 9'
Other failed institutions, though not especially exposed to credit risk per se,' 9'
289.
We may not yet know enough about the governance considerations to recommend specific
changes to debtor-creditor law, but further research may prove fruitful in this regard. See infra Part V.D.
290.
See Matthew Philips, The Monster That Ate Wall Street: How "Credit Default Swaps"-An
Insurance Against Bad Loans-Turned From a Smart Bet Into a Killer, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/161199.
291.
In other words, AIG made enormous, lopsided bets on the credit quality of mortgagebacked securities. See Christopher Cox, Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2008, at WK12 (noting that AIG had issued $440 billion in credit default swaps); Steven M.
Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis 30 (Jan.
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1306342
(explaining how rating agency downgrades of AIG's debt required AIG to post $14.5 billion in
collateral to back its $441 billion in CDS contracts). The Federal Reserve takeover was initially
coupled with a two-year $85 billion line of credit to help AIG weather the downturn. Davidoff &
Zaring, supra, at 30. Massive amounts of additional aid have subsequently been required. Id. at 3334. As of this writing, AIG has received a total of $180 billion in government bailout funds in four
separate interventions, and holds the dubious distinction of having announced the largest quarterly
loss in history-a $61.7 billion loss. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Reports
Loss of $61.7 Billion as U.S. Gives More Aid, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2009, availableat http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/03/03/business/03aig.html?.r= 1&scp=6&sq=AIG&st=cse.
292.
A CDS trader could, for example, by holding a balanced portfolio of long and short
positions, have no net credit default exposure. Lehman Brothers, for example, purportedly held $400
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were important players in the CDS market, and their inability to honor their
obligations as CDS sellers led to instability at other institutions.293
Reform proposals have generally addressed transparency and safety-andsoundness issues. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
proposed mandatory reporting and centralized clearing of CDS trades through
public securities exchanges, changes that would improve transparency and
reduce counterparty risk.2 4" The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
proposed more detailed financial disclosure concerning credit derivatives,
including the nature of the derivative, the maximum contingent liability, and
possible recoveries from third parties."'
Though these reforms are directed primarily at systemic risk, where the
major concern is the solvency of CDS sellers and dealers, the proposed reforms
would also have effects on private lenders as prospective CDS purchasers,
which in turn would affect their monitoring capacities and incentives. In
general, increased transparency in the CDS market along the lines proposed
above would likely strengthen lender governance by deterring private lender
hedging, thereby curbing the pathologies from hedging discussed earlier.296
With transparency in terms of transactions and CDS holdings, lead
banks and other private lenders who might otherwise covertly contract out of
certain credit exposures would likely be assessed market and reputational
penalties for CDS hedging. A lender's reputation as a faithful monitor has
value,2 ' and transparent hedging maneuvers would likely diminish the lender's
reputational capital in a number of ways. A bank with a reputation for hedging
might be a less desirable funding source for prospective borrowers and a less
attractive lead bank for prospective syndicate members.
A prospective borrower might fear that a hedging bank would too readily send negative market signals concerning the borrower's creditworthiness
billion in CDS contracts, but after it declared bankruptcy and its CDS contracts were cleared and
settled, its net exposure turned out to be only $5.2 billion. See Press Release, Depository Trust &
Clearing Corp., DTCC Trade Information Warehouse Completes Credit Event Processing for Lehman
Brothers (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2008/dtcc-processes_
lehmancds.php.
293.
See, e.g., Karen Brettell, et al., US Credit-LehmanThreatens CDS Market With FirstReal
Test, REUTERS, Sept. 14, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServices
AndRealEstateNews/idUSN1472586720080915 (citing Lehman as the seventh-largest credit derivatives
counterparty in the U.S., according to a Fitch Ratings survey from 2007).
294.
See Cox, supra note 291.
295.
See FIN. ACooCuNTING STANDARDS BD., STAFF POSmON No. FAS 133-1 AND FIN 45-4
(2008), http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer.blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobw
here= 1175818750586&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.
296.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
297.
See supraPart IV.B.1.
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by purchasing CDS coverage in a transparent market. For example, the
trading value of a syndicated loan would likely fall as the lead bank hedged its
exposure, since prospective loan purchasers would interpret this as both a sign
of poor loan quality and reduced monitoring incentives for the lead bank.
The borrower's stockholders would also read these signals negatively, causing
a drop in the trading value of the borrower's equity as well. A hedging bank
may also be less motivated to work with the borrower should financial distress
ensue. A potentially larger loss for the bank gives it a larger stake in the borrower's recovery as a going concern, so it might be more accommodating. By
contrast, a bank with a smaller exposure might as easily satisfy its debt
by seizing borrower assets. At the limit, a lender that is fully hedged by the
time financial distress occurs has no incentive to work with the borrower.
A hedging bank would also suffer in the market for lead bank roles in loan
syndications. Because prospective syndicate members depend on the lead
bank for monitoring and administrative services,9 they would likely wish to
avoid the potential moral hazard from lead bank hedging. For these various
reasons, private lenders might be subjected to contractual constraints on
hedging transactions, which would otherwise reduce their credit risk and
monitoring incentives.
Exchange trading of CDS contracts would also have important benefits
for lender governance by supplying market assessments of borrowers' creditworthiness. A better functioning CDS market would generally facilitate
hedging: transparency, liquidity, and reduced counterparty risk would attract
more CDS investors and would reduce hedging costs, resulting in more
accurate CDS market pricing. This in turn would generate better pricing information to reflect the quality of the underlying loans, in the same way that stock
option trading prices provide important information about market expectations concerning the value of the underlying stocks."" Transparent CDS
pricing might therefore offer an important complement to the private
monitoring that banks do.3" A sharp price drop for the CDS contracts for a
particular loan, for example, would likely spur private lenders and other creditors to investigate.
Improved CDS markets will have important effects on lender governance.
Future research may tell us more about the circumstances in which lender

298.
299.

See supra Part IV.B.1.
See Steven Manaster & Richard J.Rendleman, Jr., Option Prices as Predictorsof Equilibrium

Stock Prices, 37 J. FIN. 1043 (1982) (investigating the role of call option prices in predicting
equilibrium prices of underlying stocks).
300.
See Whitehead, supra note 250, at 672.
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influence improves firm value or performance. Credit market regulation should
account for these potential spillovers.
D.

Is Lender Governance Efficient? And Other Empirical Corporate
Governance Research

Standard corporate governance arrangements have been intensely scrutinized empirically for their potential efficiency. 1 Similarly, it makes sense
to ask whether and when bank governance might be efficient. Though the
finance canon generally stresses the conflicts among different claimant classes,
evidence suggests that the interests of private lenders and equity holders
in maximizing firm value may coincide under a range of circumstances. As
mentioned earlier, I and co-authors have offered evidence in a previous article
that bank monitoring may be efficient." 2 Other evidence suggests the same.3 3
Bank loans appear to be good for shareholders.
Even when the firm is in distress, creditor influence may be valueenhancing to the firm. According to the conventional wisdom, the conflicts
among creditors and other investors in the firm become acute as the firm
approaches insolvency, and creditors may have inefficient investment incentives. Creditors will shy away from risky projects, even those that might
enhance firm value.30 4 Creditors may also favor inefficient early liquidation,
rather than suffer additional risk to the firm that would primarily benefit
equity holders.0
301.
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. E(X)N.
409, 430 (2005) (concluding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value); Lucian
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in CorporateGovernance?, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 783
(2009) (identifying six governance provisions as being the most significant for managerial entrenchment);
John E Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
Corpnsation, and Firm Perfornance,51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 403-04 (1999); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii &
Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003) (finding
a relationship between an index of corporate governance measures and stock performance during
the 1990s); Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decdsion-Making and
Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 201 (1985) (suggesting that Golden Parachute adoption is
associated with a positive and statistically significant market reaction); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of
Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J.FIN. EtON. 377, 411 (1988) (finding that poison pill plans
do not benefit shareholders).
302.
See supranote 12 and accompanying text.
303.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing event studies showing positive
abnormal stock returns accompanying firms' public announcements of bank loans); see also supra notes
195-199 and accompanying text (discussing potential efficiency of capital expenditure covenants).
304.
See Jensen & Meckling, supranote 11, at 337.
305.
See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model of Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 542-43 (1983) (discussing senior lenders' preference for slow liquidation rather
than promoting firm viability).
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Even in distress situations, however, and against the conventional wisdom, private lenders may have efficient incentives and interests that overlap
with those of equity holders. Private lenders are likely to be the senior lenders
when a firm is in distress. If a sale of the firm is in the offing-as is becoming
more common for firms in distress-private lenders interested in maximizing
the sale price will not oppose the highest-value projects, even risky ones, if a
sale is likely to conclude before returns from the project are realized.3" This
timing is increasingly likely. Assets are sold relatively quickly, while projects
are realized over time."' If the firm enters Chapter 11 bankruptcy, private
lenders as senior claimants are likely to see their claims satisfied, at least to
some extent, with equity in the reorganized entity. To that extent, they will
have the efficient incentives of residual claimants.3 8
Private lenders may also play a crucial role in forcing management
changes as distress approaches. Lenders are much less likely than directors
to be beholden to a CEO who should be replaced. Lenders will therefore be
less willing to suffer poor management and more aggressive in forcing management changes than will many boards. Consistent with this notion of lender
activism, as earlier noted, in the presence of private debt, the probability of
CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance.3"
Better insights as to the specific channels for creditor influence on managerial decisionmaking and firm value can only enhance our understanding of
corporate governance and improve its design. Widely cited empirical studies
make claims concerning the effects of Delaware corporate law," ' staggered
boards,3 1 poison pills," 2 institutional shareholders, independent boards,"' and
the like, showing effects across a number of performance measures. Other
studies rely on elaborate corporate governance indices, constructed in an
attempt to isolate the combined effects of important traditional corporate law

306.
Baird & Rasmussen, supranote 3,at 1246 (discussing private lenders' incentives in bankruptcy).
307.
Id.
308.
Id.
309.
See supranotes 203-206 and accompanying text.
310.
See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 556
(2001) (finding evidence consistent with the theory that Delaware corporate law improves firm
value); Guhan Subramanian, The DisappearingDelaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004)
(finding that the "Delaware effect" is limited to small firms during the period 1991-1996 but not
afterward, and not for larger firms).
311.
See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 301.
312.
See Ryngaert, supra note 301.
313.
See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance, 54 BUs. LAw. 921 (1999); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack CorporateGovernance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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arrangements." 4 Important recent debates among scholars and policymakers
focus on the balance of power among shareholders, boards, and officers." ' To
complement these ongoing shareholder- and board-centered discussions,
further research on lender governance may clarify the conditions under which
it may be value enhancing. For example, banks are quite adept at monitoring
borrower cash flows,3 ,6 and lender-imposed investment constraints may be
especially effective at addressing agency costs of free cash flow."1 7 Private lender
influence may substitute for or complement standard corporate governance
mechanisms in key areas. Testing interactions among loan covenants, conventional governance provisions, and firm or industry characteristics may identify
optimal governance arrangements, and we may find predictable patterns of
efficient covenant structure. At the least, private lender influence can no longer
be ignored in analyses of corporate governance.
Future research should also account for the effects of debtor-creditor
laws and credit markets on lender incentives. As with discussions of lender
governance generally, debt decoupling has been discussed primarily in the
distress context. But even routine lender monitoring and governance are
likely to be affected." 8 As another example, loans originated with a quick
resale in mind may look very different from "buy-and-hold" loans, that initial
lenders foresee retaining in their portfolios. 9 Conventional bank regulation
and nonlegal influences such as banks' reputational stakes may matter as well.

314.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 301 (devising their E-index, consisting of
a subset of six G-index provisions); Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate
Governance Predict Firms' Market Values?: Evidence From Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 368
(2006) (proposing a corporate governance index for Korean companies and showing a strong association
between good governance and firm value); Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 301, at 144-45
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Private Lenders and Corporate Governance
The complexities of such a broad research agenda are admittedly not
trivial. Ignoring the effects of lender influence, however, misses an important
lever of corporate governance.
CONCLUSION
Inquiries on corporate governance should include the interests and influences of all investors regarding the activities of the firm, and not just equity
holders.32 Given the now quite blurry border that separates debt from equity and
the increasing separation of cash flow rights from control rights, influence over
firm governance is becoming both more fragmented and less concentrated in
the hands of conventional equity holders. A singular focus on equity holders
therefore is inapt.
Private lenders exercise important influence on managerial decisionmaking
through constraints built into their lending arrangements. Their special monitoring abilities and institutional expertise make private lenders especially useful
for constraining managerial agency costs, perhaps for the benefit of other
investors as well as the lenders themselves. Conventional corporate governance analysis has generally overlooked this important influence, and the few
existing discussions focus primarily on lender influence in the distress
context. I have shown instead that lender influence is pervasive, and that lender
governance has vast implications for both policymaking and research. Corporate
governance discourse must therefore expand beyond its traditional narrow focus
on corporate law and equity investors if it is to generate useful prescriptions for
complex modem capital markets.
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